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Theory and research about psychological development tends to be
dichotomized into two broad approaches that have never been inte
grated. The one is Piagetian-based cognitive-developmentalism, and
the other is Freudian-based psychoanalytic developmentalism.

The

first predominates in academic research and application and the sec
ond in clinical research and therapy.

This dissertation is a theo

retical integration of the Piagetian-based theory of Robert Kegan
with the Freudian-based theory of Heinz Kohut known as self psychol
ogy. A rationale for the integration of these two theories is given,
along with an overview of each theory with respect to their develop
mental aspects.

Analysis of their respective basic concepts and

constructs is provided, demonstrating differences as well as under
lying similarities.

These concepts include definitions of the self,

Kohut's "selfobject" and Kegan's "culture of embeddedness, 11 and their
respective notions of the intrapsychic aspects of the process of
psychological growth.

A model that integrates the stages on Kegan's

developmental helix with Kohut's self-selfobject constellations is
offered.

It is suggested that the common premise that underlies

their views has to do with the bipolarity of each view--that the

unity of the self is composed of the balanced opposites of autonomy
versus inclusion.
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CHAPTER I
BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION
The observation that traditional psychoanalytic developmental
theory holds less influence than it once did in the field of psycho
therapy theory and practice, and perhaps still less in the more gen
eral field of developmental theory, is not likely to evoke strong
disagreement. The reasons for this situation are many, including the
continuing evolution of psychoanalytic theory itself, the nearly
bewildering proliferation of psychological theories, each struggling
to claim some turf in the psychological field, and the historically
separate development of areas and theories of psychology, even when
these theories address the same area of psychology, such as develop
ment.
Although psychoanalytic theory now shares the field with many
others, no single theory has ever been able to supplant it or rival
it with respect to its comprehensive metapsychology, its fundamental
simplicity, its power of theoretical explanation for the infinite
complexity and variation of human behavior, and its value for the
explanation and treatment of a variety of psychological disturbances.
Freud's developmental theory, grounded firmly in his biologically
based drive theory and in his psychosexual stage theory culminating
in the Oedipal complex which produces the tripartite structural ego,
has undergone significant change from within the psychoanalytic ranks

1

2

(through such theorists as Erik Erikson, Melanie Klein, Heinz
Hartmann, Harry Stack Sullivan, and later ego and object relations
psychologists), but many of its essential elements have remained the
same.
One of the perennial criticisms of psychoanalytic developmental
theory is that its psychosexual stage theory, and even its elabora
tions of later ego development by such theorists as Erikson and Hart
mann, grounded as they are in the physiologically based drive theory
of Freud, are not based on empirical observations of development, but
on clinical evidence, and that evidence derived from memory of infant
experience reproduced in regressed states.

Furthermore, it is com

monly argued that psychoanalytic theory of normal development is
derived from and constructed out of pathologically rooted material
rather than normal material.
The point is that there has been and there remains a gulf be
tween psychoanalytically based developmental theory and most other
developmental theories, especially those coming from general psychol
ogy, academic psychology, and empirically based approaches to the
study of development.

Guntrip (1971) observed, "Psychoanalysis could

derive much help, so far as theory formulation is concerned, from
general psychology" (p. 13).

It could be argued that psychoanalytic

theory has made some �ffort to assimi 1 ate" but not much effort to
II
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accorrmodate 11 (to use Piagetian terminology) the scientific findings

and the supportive theories of other developmental approaches such as
Piaget's cognitive developmental theory.

As Kegan (1982) said,
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Psychoanalytic theory now has very little life within aca
demic psychology and yet it is the guiding source of prac
tice in most hospitals and clinics. Cognitive-developmen
talism has had a robust life in the university and almost
no influence whatsoever in the clinic. (p. 14).
This isolation of psychoanalytic theory from other developmental
theory and study need not be considered a problem as long as each
theory appears to be functioning effectively within its own area.
But it would be hard to dispute the claim that clinical psychology,
struggling as it is in recent years with increasing numbers of pa
tients whose issues appear to be of a developmental and object
relational nature (Hamilton, 1988; Kernberg, 1984; Kohut, 1971;
Masterson, 1985) rather than issues based primarily on intrapsychic
drive conflict, could not benefit from some closer interaction with
the rich and abundant material, as well as the theoretical insight
from cognitive-developmental and other normal developmental infant
research.
The problem is that traditional psychoanalytic developmental
theory, valuable as it once was for its explanatory power and as a
basis for therapy, appears to be less and less viable as theory of
psychological development in the light of current infant research
(Lichtenberg, 1983; Stern, 1985).

This viewpoint appears increas

ingly valid with respect to normal development and also, but perhaps
less clearly so, with respect to pathological development.

As

Lichtenberg said, "It seems clear that much bridging must be accom
plished before analytic thinking on drives, ego functioning, and
early intrapsychic conflict can be integrated with the data of infant
researchers" (p. 16).
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There is a need, therefore, to investigate the question of the
extent to which some of the concepts and constructs, and even some of
the basic premises, of psychoanalytic developmental theory, based
largely on data derived within the patient/therapist context, can be
effectively related to and possibly integrated with the more academic
and experimentally based developmental theories such as those based
on Piagetian cognitive-developmentalism and current infant research.
There have been efforts by theorists to lay the broad outlines
of the groundwork for the eventual integration of the contributions
of Freud and Piaget.

Fast (1985) stated that the earliest efforts to

propose and promote the idea of studying areas of congruence between
the essentially cognitive framework of Piaget and the essentially
affective domain of psychoanalytic theory came from Rapaport.

It was

in the expansion of psychoanalytic theory by ego psychology to in
clude the concept of a conflict-free zone of ego development that
Rapaport (cited in Fast, 1985) saw an opportunity to find common
ground between drive and defense theory and the cognitive develop
mentalism of Piaget.
The concept of a conflict-free area of the ego, as it was de
veloped especially by the work of Hartmann (1958), suggests a line of
development that is essentially free from the area of the drives and
defenses and the conflict between the structures of the mind.

This

separate line of development has its source in inborn mechanisms that
are autonomous of the drives, developing instead by maturation in the
context of interaction and experience with the largely neutral and
impersonal aspects of the environment.

This conflict-free area
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included such functions as cognition, perception, memory, and motor
skills, and these mature through adaptive engagement with the envi
ronment.
This addition to the psychoanalytic conception of the ego seemed
to provide a place for the inclusion of Piaget's work within the
psychoanalytic framework.

Fast (1985) suggested that the two most

elaborately developed efforts to integrate Freud and Piaget by the
use of Hartmann's (1958) conflict-free zone of the ego are those of
Wolff (1960) and Greenspan (cited in Fast, 1985).

Wolff suggested

that the two frameworks complement each other, addressing different
but overlapping aspects of human behavior.

The one area, comprising

the development of intelligence, perception, and adaptive behavior,
is best explained by Piaget's sensorimotor stages viewed in the con
text of ego psychology's concept of inborn ego mechanisms; these
behavior patterns are activated when organic needs are not pressing.
The other area of behavior patterns emerges when drive tensions are
pressing and the infant is responding to inner forces rather than
focusing on the external world and learning to adapt to it.
Greenspan (cited in Fast, 1985) also tended to see two separate
lines of development, one affective and the other cognitive.

He

suggested that there are two ego boundaries oriented to different
"stimulus worlds," one being the inner world, the stimuli "connected
to drives, wishes, feelings, internal representations and affectively
colored human relationships" (p. 129), and the other set of stimuli
coming from the outer world, relating "more (or less) to the imper
sonal, often inanimate world" (p. 129).

Fast (1985) suggested that
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the problem with both of these efforts towards integrating Freud and
Piaget is that they maintain an inherent dichotomy between affective
and cognitive development; and that while they accommodate Piaget's
contribution in terms of his delineation of successive cognitive
stages, they miss his deeper contribution, which relates to his view
of the underlying processes by which psychological growth takes place.
According to Fast (1985), the basic issue for Piaget "is the
development of the individual's ability to differentiate the subjec
tive and the objective, the internal and the external, the psychical
and the physical" (p. 3).

This view of Piaget is very similar to

that of Kegan (1982), whose work is a major part of this study.
Fast, as Kegan, emphasizes that Piaget's work is misunderstood when
it is limited to mere stages of cognitive development.

She stated

that for Piaget affect "is integral to all the individual's experi
ence and to the development of all mental structures" (p. 4).

This

same point is made unequivocally by Piaget in a 1981 translation of a
series of lectures on affect that he delivered at the Sorbonne in
1953-54.

He stated, "Affective states that have no cognitive ele

ments are never seen, nor are behaviors found that are wholly cogni
tive" (p. 5).
Fast (1985) proposed a framework for integrating Freud and
Piaget that maintains the essential unity of cognitive and affective
development.

In her view the differentiation of self and non-self,

the subjective and the objective, is the basic, underlying process
out of which all facets of development emerge, the affective and
interpersonal as well as the cognitive and impersonal.

Her aim is
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"to provide an object-relational model for the development of psychic
structure" (p. ix) that will take account of all the major psychoana
lytic conceptualizations of developmental phenomenon within the basic
Piagetian matrix of self and non-self differentiation.
Calling her approach "event theory," Fast (1985) focused on the
individual's experience of an action or event as the basic building
blocks or psychological material out of which psychological develop
ment arises.

Her use of term 11 event 11 is similar to Piaget's concept

of 11 action, 11 which is registered initially in sensorimotor schemes,
but her term emphasizes the mental and experiential aspect of the
action, and it defines an event as inherently object-relational in
the sense that it always involves the infant in interaction with some
aspect of the environment.

The key issue here is the point that in

early infancy an event, even though from an external point of view it
involves an infant self and an other, is experienced by the infant
simply as an event, the self and other not being differentiated as
pects of the action, and not having independent mental representa
tion.
The significance of this conceptualization of early experience
is that it leads to a new way of understanding the phenomenon of
prim�ry narcissism, which from the psychoanalytic perspective is
explained as the infant's total self absorption and its concomitant
obliviousness to its environment.

Event theory suggests that what

appears as the phenomenon of primary narcissism is merely a product
of the infant's level of mental organization, its nondifferentiated
experience of self and other, rather than an affective involvement
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with the self which in later development shifts toward the object
world.
This brief and incomplete sketch of Fast's (1985) approach to
integrating Freud and Piaget is included here to introduce the impor
tant notions which she suggested are necessary to an integration of
the theories that does justice to them both--the essential indivisi
bility of affect and cognition, the process of self and non-self
differentiation and reintegration as the matrix of all psychological
development, and the consequent reformulation of narcissism as a
mental state in which the self is completely or partially undifferen
tiated from the other.

Each of these notions will be taken up in

considerable detail below as aspects of the work of Robert Kegan and
Heinz Kohut.

Kegan's theory of development is based on a similar

integration of affect and cognition, and he identified "motion" as
the ground out of which personality emerges.

And as stated before,

Kegan's view of Piaget's underlying framework for development is
similar to Fast's (1985).

As for Kohut, his unique view of narcis

sism can be understood in the same framework as Fast's nondifferenti
ation of self and other.
The purpose of this study is considerably narrower than Fast's
(1985) ambitious attempt to integrate Freud and Piaget.

Its purpose

is to explore the limited question of whether one specific cognitive
developmental theory can be fruitfully related to and perhaps inte
grated with one specific psychoanalytic developmental theory.

The

two contemporary theorists to be studied are Robert Kegan and Heinz
Kohut.

Kohut will be studied as the representative of an emerging
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branch of psychoanalytic theory known as self psychology.

Kegan will

be studied as representing a Piagetian based developmental theory he
called constructive-developmentalism.
There are obvious advantages and disadvantages to such a limita
tion, and this issue will be addressed in more depth as the disserta
tion progresses.

One obvious criticism that might be made of this

limitation of scope is that these two theorists may not be fully
representative of the respective theoretical fields.

One response to

such a criticism might be that, given the state of complex diversity
in contemporary psychological theory, it is neither possible· nor
desirable to look for a single theory or theorist to be fully repre
sentative of the broader paradigm out of which the theory may be
evolving.

Secondly, it is the position of this author that an in

tensely focused investigation may be what is called for here if the
purpose is to search for small but significant beginnings in the
larger effort to bring some integration and synthesis to a field as
diverse and fragmented as psychology currently is.
This study is also intended to be limited by its nature and
purpose.

It is the intention of the author to present an analysis of

the two theorists that is based for the most part on the primary
writings of Kohut and Kegan themselves.

In the case of Kohut, how

ever, some source material will be drawn from individuals who worked
closely with him and have begun efforts to present the development of
Kohut 1 s thinking and writing in an organized, sequential manner.

The

work of Ornstein (1978) and Wolf (1988) will be especially helpful in
this respect.

In the aspects of the study that will present the
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separate theories of Kegan and Kohut it is not the intention of the
writer to analyze or comment but to present as clearly and accurately
as possible a summary of the respective theories that is consistent
with the original intention of the authors.

However, the heart of

the study--the attempt to investigate the extent to which the two
theories might be integrated and thereby shed light on and support
each other--is original and, therefore, will be supported primarily
by theoretical argument rather than by reference to literature.

It

is in this aspect of the study that the writer may be extrapolating
at times from the original terms and concepts of Kohut and Kegan to
demonstrate that underlying patterns of integration and synthesis
might be justified.
The rationale for choosing the work of Kegan and Kohut to ex-·
plore the question of bridging and eventually integrating analytic
theory with cognitive-developmentalism is that in both cases these
theorists begin with and continue to build their theories on the
foundation of the primary originators of the general theories in
question--Kegan on Piaget and Kohut on Freud.

Kegan's research and

theorizing is an attempt to build a metapsychology out of Piaget's
underlying framework.

His psychology is an extrapolation of Piaget's

epistemological, biological, and philosophical framework which Kegan
(1982) suggested is a "Trojan horse with an army inside as daring as
psychoanalysis" (p. 42).

He suggested that, while Piaget and Freud

both view psychological growth in developmental terms, psychoanalytic
theory tends to be a theory about affect, and cognitive-developmental
theory tends to be about cognition.

Kegan's intention was to locate
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a broader context than either affect or cognition as the matrix out
of which personality development emerges.

Thus, while the primary

purpose of Kegan's work is not to articulate a theoretical integra
tion of psychoanalytic and cognitive developmental theory, his work
helps to lay the groundwork for such an effort.
A second major element in Kegan's theory besides developmental
ism is what he called constructivism--the idea that the human indi
vidual is constitutive of his own experience, an idea which, accord
ing to Fingarette (1963), crosses philosophy, theology, literary
criticism, and psychology.

Kegan said that in psychology the idea of

the human being as a participant creator of his own experience is an
11

axiom of existential, phenomenological, Gestalt, Piagetian, percep
tion theorist, and Kelly-construct approaches" (p. 11).

Thus, Kegan

appeared to be suggesting a metapsychology that not only integrates
analytic and cognitive developmental theories but also includes what
is sometimes referred to as the "Third Force" in psychology--the
existential-humanistic view of human nature.
In summary, Kegan's work is an attempt to build a psychology--in
this case psychology meaning not only a description and explanation
of the inner processes that occur in a person's development, but also
what it is like for the person to experience these shifts and
changes--based on the foundation of Piaget's remarkable and lucid
objective descriptions of universal perceptual and cognitive develop
mental shifts and the foundation of the existential premise that a
person is literally a meaning-maker, that is, a person is partici
pantly involved in constructing his or her own experience of life.
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The bridge from Kegan to Kohut can be made at this point by the
use of a rather lengthy quotation from Kegan (1982) in which he
offered a rationale for his work as well as an explanation of the
connection of his work to Piagetian and existential, or what he
called "constructive" theory. After recogniiing the value of these
theories for revealing the universal shape and sequence of the pro
cesses and stages that a person goes through in constructing one's
own development, he said:
And yet this constructive-developmental perspective has
taken no interest whatever in the equally important, but
quite different, side of the same activity--the way that
activity is experienced by a dynamically maintained "self,"
the rhythms and labors of the struggle to make meaning, to
have meaning, to protect meaning, to enhance meaning, to
1 ose meaning, and to 1 ose the self" a 1 ong the way. The
Piagetian approach, viewing meaning-making from the out
side, descriptively, has powerfully advanced a conception
of that activity as naturally epistemological; it is about
the balancing and rebalancing of subject and object, or
self and other. But what remains ignored from this ap
proach is a consideration of the same activity from the
inside, what Fingarette would call the "participative."
From the point of view of the "self," then, what is at
stake in preserving any given balance is the ultimate ques
tion of whether the "self" shall continue to be, a naturally ontological matter. (p. 12)
II

The fact that Kegan placed the "self" in the center of his psychology
does not automatically place him philosophically or psychologically
within or even close to the self psychology framework of Kohut, for
as Chessick (1985) said, one is hard put to find two authors who use
the term self in the same way. Nevertheless, it is Kegan's placement
of the ongoing experiential sense of oneself (including the perennial
experience of losing and reconstituting the self) as central to his
psychology that provides the basis in this dissertation for a

13

fundamental bridge between Kegan and Kohut.
In Kohut's (1977) self psychology it is also the self--a "center
of initiative" present virtually from birth--that is central to his
psychology.

Kohut (1984) spoke of the survival of the "nuclear pro

gram of the self" as the "basic force in everyone's personality"
(p. 147) and he repeatedly referred to disintegration anxiety as the
deepest anxiety that man can experience (Kohut, 1977, 1984).

Thus it

is exploring and understanding the nature of and the experience of an
ongoing "self" that both Kegan and Kohut view as the proper province
of the study of psychology.
With respect to his broad description of the process of psycho
logical development of the emergence of the self, Kohut's conception
is very similar to Kegan's.

Kohut (1984) said that "the developmen

tal moves of normal psychological life must be seen in the changing
nature of the relationships between the self and its selfobjects"
(p. 52).

By "selfobject" Kohut was referring to any other or "ob

ject" whom the self uses in its own service to maintain itself and
who is in some degree experienced as a part of the self.

This con

cept will be dealt with at length in Chapters II and III.
To summarize:

Both Kegan and Kohut postulate a sense of self as

a central and organizing feature of an individual's psychological
life and development.

Second they both view this sense of self as

actively participating in its own development.

Third, their field of

inquiry in studying psychological development includes the inner
experience of what it is and means to be such a self in development.
Fourth, they each end up describing the most fundamental features of
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the stages or eras of psychological development in terms of succes
sive configurations of the self and other balance.
The question being addressed in this paper is whether or not
these two theories can be demonstrated to be fundamentally compatible
on a number of levels, from their philosophical bases to their psy
chological conceptions of the self/other relationship, to the process
of internalizing psychological structure and the roles of the self
and other in this process.

It is the hypothesis of this paper that

not only can the theories be demonstrated to be essentially compati
ble, but that in exploring their areas of congruence and difference
each theory will have unique aspects and insights that can throw
light on certain areas of the other theory so as to enrich them both.
To the extent that this effort is at all successful, the possible
integration of these two theories may serve as part of a basis for
addressing the larger problem outlined above--the essential estrange
ment of psychoanalytic developmental theory from its counterpart in
academic developmental theory.
The organizational plan of this study is as follows:

It will

begin with a summary overview of the separate developmental theories
of Kegan and Kohut.

Following the overview will be a more detailed

explication of the key concepts, the psychological constructs, and
the specific terminology used by each writer. The purpose of this
terminology section will be to present as accurately as possible the
precise intentions of each author in his use of language.

Terms and

concepts that relate to similar psychological processes will be com
pared and contrasted so as to bring out the unique emphasis of each
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writer.

While the similarities and compatibility of their views will

be noted at this time, there will be no argument for their overall
integration during this section.
Of the concepts compared and analyzed, the one that is the most
complex and will require the most explication will be the nature and
process of psychological growth, especially the internalization pro
cess and the building of psychological structure as seen from the
viewpoint of each author.

This issue requires a special considera

tion because it is so central to developmental theory from both the
psychoanalytic view and the cognitive view of psychological growth.
This section will be especially important to an understanding of the
basic differences and similarities of Kegan and Kohut.

It will also

serve as the major area in which to demonstrate how each theory has
unique aspects and strengths that can shed light on areas within the
other theory and perhaps fill out existing areas that are weakly
sketched or even evoke possibilities for expansion of areas in the
other theory.
The third chapter will be the formal argument for the compati
bility of several fundamental concepts of the two theories as well as
many of the specific constructs used in explaining and describing
psychological growth.

This argument will have two thrusts.

The

first will be that the theories are in principle compatible and com
plementary, and the second will be that their proposed integration
could be beneficial to each of them in their separate efforts at
continued development and support from research.
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The chapter on integration will start with the idea that there
is a basic corrrnon premise about the nature of the self that can be
used as a framework for the integration.

This premise is the para

doxical one that the unity of the self is composed and maintained by
the dynamic tension between two components or poles that exist in
complementary opposition to each other.

It will then be argued that

there is a remarkable resemblance of the point of view of each theo
rist in the nature and purpose or drive of each side of the dual
composition of the self.

Following this will be a comparison of the

nature and function of the environment or "other" with respect to
each pole of the self, since both Kegan and Kohut have a strong
object-relational cast to their views.

After establishing the basic

framework of integration, an attempted synthesis of their views of
the process of psychological growth will be offered.

It will be

suggested that Kegan•s view does tend to emphasize the cognitive and
perceptual aspects of growth and that his contribution lies more in
the larger view of the major reorganizational shifts of development.
Kohut, on the other hand, emphasized the affective dimension of de
velopment and his contribution lies in his microscopic view of devel
opment.

Finally, some areas of reciprocal strengths and weaknesses

will be pointed out.
The final section will suggest some possibilities for continued
research with respect to the specific content of this study--the
integration of the work of Kohut and Kegan.

Since Kohut 1 s self psy

chology is based much more on clinical material and issues and
Kegan•s developmental theory is based more on studies of the normal
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interactions of individuals from a psychological (self/other balance)
viewpoint, an effort will be made to suggest the type of studies that
could apply and test the insights of Kegan with respect to clinical
issues that are being dealt with in a self psychology framework;
conversely, an effort will be made to suggest studies that would
apply and test the insights of self psychology with respect to the
behavior of individuals seen in the framework of Kegan's self/other
balances.

CHAPTER II
OVERVIEW
The purpose of this chapter is to present separate overviews of
the developmental theories of Kohut and Kegan. In Chapter I some of
the broad similarities of a few of their basic ideas were mentioned,
but a coherent presentation of their theories was not given. The
intention is to present a broad enough overview of each theory to
allow the reader to hold the main framework of each one in mind and

to get a clear grasp of the basic concepts without getting bogged
down in a great deal of intricate detail.

A more detailed explica

tion of main concepts will be offered in the following chapter, along
with some contrast and comparison of the concepts.
Kohut
Theoretical Roots
It is interesting to note with respect to Kohut's current in
fluence that in a review by Strauss, Yager, and Strauss (1984), "The
Cutting Edge in Psychiatry," in which leading American psychiatrists
were asked for their views on the most important developments in
their field in the last decade, only 13 publications were listed
often enough to be considered of major importance, and of these 13
only one author was listed twice--Heinz Kohut, for The Analysis of
the Self (1971) and The Restoration of the Self (1977).
18
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Kohut's self psychology is historically rooted in Freud's psy
choanalytic theory.

He was born in Vienna in 1913 and received his

medical degree from the University of Vienna in 1938.
arrived at the University of Chicago.

In 1940 he

He studied at the Chicago

Institute for Psychoanalysis and taught psyc_hoanalytic theory there
for 15 years.

His theoretical roots are in Freudian thought, and one

cannot help being struck by the pains Kohut took, especially in his
early writing, to demonstrate that the psychology of the self is not
a fundamental break from Freudian theory but rather is continuous
with and complementary to it.

However, most reviewers end up seeing

self psychology as having some fundamental and irreconcilable differ
ences from traditional psychoanalytic theory (Baker & Baker, 1987;

Chessick, 1985; Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983; Ornstein, 1978).

It is this writer's view that the fundamental differences be
tween Kohut and traditional psychoanalytic theory can best be under
stood in the framework of the fundamental shift from the 19th century
philosophical and scientific outlook of mechanistic determinism to
the 20-century views of relativism, field theory, and intrinsic in
separability of the observer-observed unit in scientific study.

Both

Chessick (1985} and Ornstein {1978} concluded that self psychology is
indeed a new paradigm.

For this writer it is helpful to think of

Kohut's relation to classical psychoanalytic theory in terms of
Kuhn's (1962) description of the nature of the relationship of a new
paradigm to the one it is superseding--that it is a larger perspec
tive which may include much of the knowledge gained and even some of
the constructs of the former, but which goes beyond the limits of the
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former and may reinterpret much of the factual material of the for
mer.

Kohut, for example, retains such fundamental concepts as the

Oedipus complex, libido, and aggression; but he redefines them and
explains their place and value from a new perspective.
Wolf (1980) offered the following general description of self
psychology with respect to distinguishing it from classical psycho
analytic theory.
Self psychology represents a shift in emphasis toward the
explicit acknowledgement of the empathic-experiential base
of psychoanalytic data--introspective data had always been
implicit in Freud's theorizing--concomitant with a shift in
conceptualization from a natural science model of the psy
chic apparatus to an experiential self-selfobject model.
Furthermore, the self psychological focus on interactions
of the self with selfobjects results in a more balanced
view of the influence of the environment on the subject.
These environmental influences are not seen as mere acci
dents impinging on drive and ego development that is rela
tively innate and autonomous. Rather, in self psychology
the interactions between self and selfobjects are conceptu
alized in terms of continuous and reciprocal influences.
The feedback process between the self and its selfobject
milieu result in the continuous modification of both. The
relationship, therefore, is gradually changed over time.
In this way, the self-selfobject model makes it possible to
construct a developmental line of selfobject relations (a
more euphonious term than self-selfobject relations).
(pp. 118-119)
Wolf indicated that at the present time the developmental line of
selfobject relations is rather scantily sketched out in self psychol
ogy theory.

Part of the intention of this study is to examine

whether the much more elaborated line of development that Kegan
presents might be usefully related to an attempt to expand upon the
core of Kohut's line of development.
This overview, and this entire study, present self psychology
in its later formulations by Kohut without paying much attention to
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the historical or theoretical evolution of his thought, a necessary
limitation of this study, but at some cost to the appreciation of
Kohut's lifelong struggle to both maintain his ties to classical
psychoanalytic theory and to allow his essentially new vision to
emerge.

In 1977, after more than 25 years of the continual process

of reexamining what he believed to be new clinical data in the light
of existing and as well as expanded theory, Kohut stated:
The infantile sexual drive in isolation is not the primary
psychological configuration--whether on the oral, anal,
urethral, or phallic level. The primary psychological
configuration (of which the drive is only a constituent) is
the experience of the relation between the self and the
empathic selfobject. (p. 122)
In his earlier work Kohut {1972) had defined the nature of the self
as part of the mind's content, and he viewed the self as a psycholog
ical abstraction derived from the data of psychoanalytic experience-
the sense of an ongoing "I" that is continuous in time and cohesive
in configuration.

By 1977 "the self finally emerged as a bipolar,

supraordinate configuration--but not as a fourth agency of the
mind--with its own center of initiative and thus no longer only a
content of the mind" (Ornstein, 1978, p. 97).
Self psychology theory is based on data derived from empathic
experiential introspection in the psychoanalytic setting.

In his

work with narcissistic personality disorders Kohut began to experi
ence and observe a quality and kind of transference that was an anom
aly to the standard transference neuroses of neurotic patients.

When

he allowed these new types of transference-like attachments to evolve
without interpreting them to the patients as infantile sexual or
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aggressive wishes, he observed that the ''use" these patients were
making of him had distinct characteristics that could be described
and explained in terms of fundamental therapist-patient, self-other,
or to use Kohut 's terminology, self-selfobject configurations.

These

fundamental configurations were essentially different from classic
transferences in that they were not transferences of previously in
ternalized affect laden objects which were projected onto the thera
pist but were actual efforts on the part of the patient to reestab
lish an aborted developmental process that required a specific "use"
of an appropriately responsive other (selfobject) in an intricate and
interdependent relationship.
From the data of such empathically tuned participation and
observation, Kohut reconstructed a new view of psychological develop
ment with respect to the nature of the infant-caregiver relationship
as a whole, the unique roles of each, the motivation driving the
interactions, the specific configurations that the dyadic unit takes,
and the actual nature of psychological growth in its microprocesses.
The Self and the Selfobject
Central to Kohut's (1977) theory is the self, a whole self
which is present virtually from birth.

He stated:

I suggest that we undertake the examination of the question
of the existence of a rudimentary self in earliest infancy
from perhaps a surprising starting point, namely, by
stressing that the human environment reacts to even the
smallest baby as if it had already formed such a self.
. . . The crucial question concerns, of course, the point
in time when, within the matrix of mutual empathy between
the infant and his self-object, the baby's innate potenti
alities and the self-object's expectations with regard to
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the baby converge.

(p. 99)

This "self" comes to occupy a central position in the personal
ity in Kohut's mature theory, and the self is understood to be a
center of initiative and perception with its own "nuclear program."
It may be helpful to conceptualize the self's motivation to realize
its "nuclear program" in terms similar to the "self-actualizing"
tendencies as presented by Rogers (1961) or Maslow (1954).
This self, which at first is rather diffuse and has no subjec
tive awareness of itself, nevertheless has enough cohesion and firm
ness virtually from the beginning to interact with its environment
(not just react or act in what might be described as preprograrrmed,
generalized responses) in subtle, responsive, initiatory ways sugges
tive of delicate dialogue with the attuned caregiver.

In other

words, there appears to be genuine reciprocity in the infant
caregiver interaction. The infant studies now being carried out by
such researchers as Stern (1985) and Lichtenberg (1983) offer strong
observational support for this view of an infant's capacities.
In order to realize its nuclear program, the self requires a
life-long, mutual (but with distinct roles which undergo great
changes through the emerging developmental process), interdependence
with its selfobjects.

The nature of the early self-selfobject inter

action and the role that the selfobject provides for the self is
described by Kohut (1977):
The child's rudimentary psyche participates in the self
object's highly developed psychic organization; the child
experiences the feeling states of the selfobject--they are
transmitted to the child via touch and tone of voice and
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perhaps by still other means--as if they were his own.
(p. 86)
Thus the selfobject provides the glue, so to speak, that main
tains the cohesion of the infant psyche.

In general, the selfobject

serves the function of providing an externalized form of the infant's
own tenuous but essentially whole internal psychic apparatus.

In

other words, the selfobject, experienced by the self as though it
were performing its own functions by itself, operates as the exter
nalized psychic apparatus of the self in performing such functions as
the regulation of affective extremes, self-soothing, organizing expe
rience, and maintaining a sense of coherence both spatially and tem
porally.

The empathically attuned caregiver senses the inner state

of the infant, takes in the psychic state of the infant and resonates
with it, whether it be experiencing joyful well-being or overwhelming
fear.

Then the caregiver, especially in the case of the infant expe

riencing any distress, by remaining in subtle attunement with the
second by second experience of the infant, organizes, regulates,
calms, and restores a sense of well-being by herself experiencing,
demonstrating, and corrmunicating her capacity to manage the upset and
restore a sense of well-being.

Thus the infant actually participates

in the experience of the psychic regulation carried out by the care
giver, much as, in a crude analogy, a child participates in the expe
rience of walking when an adult places the child's feet on top of his
or her own and walks while holding the child against his or her legs.
The nature of the psychological growth process is described by
Kohut as taking place over thousands and thousands of
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microinternalizations which occur normally in the handling of "opti
mal frustrations" (small upsets handled by the competent caregiver as
described just above).

This process, which will be described in more

detail below, is called "transmuting internalization" by Kohut, and
is the process by which psychic structure is slowly built up by re
peated experiences in the self-selfobject dyad in which the self gets
stronger by participating in the psychological functioning of the
selfobject and then internalizing the soothing and regulating func
tions that were carried out by the caregiver.

In the case of gross

lack of attunement the self structure remains diffuse and depleted,
or it attempts to build compensatory or defensive structure that may
be pathological.
Although the growth and strengthening of most psychological
structure, both normal and pathological, takes place slowly through
numerous, minute interactions, Kohut recognized that some psychologi
cal growth takes place more intensely and massively.

Some pathology

may result from massive trauma and some normal growth takes place in
phase-appropriate internalizations of a more massive type than the
ongoing microinternalizations.

Kohut 1 s view of the Oedipal phase is

an example of a more massive internalization and a concomitant shift
in the self-selfobject configuration.

A descriptive summary of the

developmental stages will be presented below.
The Bipolar Concept
Turning now to a description of the fundamental modes that the
self-selfobject unit takes in order to facilitate the psychological
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growth and to maintain psychological health and vigor of the emerging
self, the self requires three general configurational modes of being
in relationship to selfobjects, and as the self develops, each of
these three modes undergoes a slow transformation from a relationship
of near total dependence to one of relative dependence and eventually
to mutual interdependence.

The naming and defining of these three

modes come directly from the psychoanalytically derived data that
Kohut experienced and struggled with in an attempt to fit these data
into classical theory.
Two of these modes are basic to Kohut's view of the development
of the self, and they form the poles of the 11 bipolar11 self.

These

two--the grandiose self (GS), which Kohut formerly called the narcis
sistic self, and the idealized parent imago (IPI)--have separate
lines of development although they are intricately related.

Kohut

used the image of magnetic poles to suggest the relationship of these
aspects of the self.

The third aspect of the self--the innate tend

encies in the nuclear program of a given self towards the eventual
realization of the unique talents and skills inherent in that self-
are played out on the "tension arc" (Kohut, 1984) formed between the
poles of the grandiose self and the idealized parent imago.
Some clarification with respect to the difficulty that many
critics have expressed regarding the separate developmental lines of
the "bipolar" self or even a 11 tripolar11 self (if the third transfer
ence-like configuration is extrapolated into another component of the
self) may be helpful at this point.
lines are not unrelated.

These separate developmental

They are the natural and inevitable efforts
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of the one, underlying or supraordinate self to maintain its cohesion
and realize its unique nuclear program.

Kohut theorized (Ornstein,

1978) that the child begins in a state of primary narcissism in which
the infant "experiences the mother and her ministrations, not as a
you and its actions, but within a view of the world in which the I
you differentiation has not yet been established" (p. 430).

This

perfect state, however, is soon disturbed by maturational pressures
from within and environmental frustrations from without.

The baby

seeks to restore its perfect state with two separately developing
attempts to build up new systems of perfection, one along an object
relational line, and the other by developing the narcissistic (gran
diose) self.

Thus the bipolar self represents the two basic modes of

connection that the underlying self creates with its environmental
objects to ensure its life project.

The third constituent, the tal

ents and skills, is a later product that emerges in distinct form and
strength (much as later ego competencies are understood to develop in
classical theory) from the tension field _created by the interaction
of the two basic poles--one seeking merely to express its unique and
grandiose self celebration and the other seeking to shape itself like
and achieve the realization of external ideals and models.

The modi

fication of and inhibition of some of the expressions of the grandi
ose pole is required to achieve the realization of the ideals, thus
creating the tension arc between them.
The GS construct can be understood by examining its unique
self-selfobject mode (this is the first "transference-like'' phenome
non that Kohut observed in his narcissistic patients, and he referred
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to it as the mirror transference).
is unique to this individual.

This is the pole of the self that

It was born with this potential as

though imprinted in the genetic coding of its DNA.

This aspect of

the self does not develop by taking in aspects of its significant
environment, whether as part or whole objects.

Instead, this grandi

ose constituent of the self seeks to develop what is already inherent
in it by establishing a self-selfobject relationship that nourishes
its life project by mirroring, confirming, holding, and admiring the
efforts of the infant to express itself.

The infant, experiencing

the delighted response of the selfobject as to some extent its own,
experiences an enhancement of self-worth and self-esteem in the pro
cess.

Baker and Baker (1987) stated, "The mirroring responses of the

parent are concerned with the maintenance and development of self
esteem and self-assertive ambitions" (p. 3).

It is the term "ambi

tions" that Kohut constantly uses to refer to the direction and shape
that the nuclear program of the grandiose self will take.
The GS can be related to classical theory as the aspect of the
individual that incessantly seeks unbridled expression--the drive
element.

In most object relations theories it would be similar to

the true self.

In relation to Kegan's theory, it could be compared

to the pole of the self that pulls for autonomy, separateness, and
uniqueness.

The grandiose self seeks to express itself in two basic

ways--exhibitionistic displays (the pleasure of being itself), and
grandiose fantasies (the sense of initiative and power).
The other constituent of the bipolar self is the idealized
parent imago (IPI).

This line of development is an object relational

29
line of development more akin to the view of development in most
object relations theories in that the self that develops along this
line is intrinsically formed in relation to and by internalization of
aspects of the other.

Its healthy development contributes to the

eventual capacity for mature object relations in which the other is
experienced and loved as a unique and separate person.

This line of

development results in the drive regulation and inhibition (to use
classical language) of the grandiose drive expressions.

This is one

source of the tension between the two poles of the self.
The IPI line of development, like the GS, is an effort on the
part of the infant to maintain the perfection of its early infancy.
In both cases a selfobject is used to maintain the self; but in this
case (which comes slightly later in actual development because it
requires the beginning capacity to separate self and other), the
effort to maintain a sense of perfection (power and cohesion) is
accomplished by projecting the grandiosity onto the object and par
ticipating in its strength.

The internalization of the IPI through

out childhood results in the internal structure that forms the ego
matrix--the drive regulation that once was performed by the parent,
and ego ideals, the ego-syntonic values and goals that guide and pull
a person forward towards certain goals.

In this paper some compari

son will be made between Kohut's IPI pole and Kegan's pole towards
inclusion, dependence, and belonging.
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Selfobject Functions
To describe the development of the self with its bipolar con
stituents as above is somewhat misleading in that it suggests a view
of development that sees the individual as a separate entity develop
ing from within its intrapsychic process by use of some external care
and nutriments, but Kohut 1 s view is much more fundamentally object
relational than that.

The self-selfobject relationship is a dynamic

field and remains so from infancy to death, although obviously under
going changes of a transformational order that change the relative
roles of each part of the self-selfobject unit.

Thus, the very na

ture of the self is that its reality is maintained in a context or
culturing environment (to use the language of Kegan, 1982) of others
that are not just separate others but always in some ways intimately
and essentially a part of the self.

This concept recalls Winnicott 1 s

(cited in Davis & Wallbridge, 1981) simple and astounding insight

expressed in his famous statement that "there is no such thing as a
baby, 11 meaning more than the simple fact that there is never a baby
without a mother (even a classical Freudian steeped in 19th-century
science could accept that fact), but that any attempt to study a baby
(or self) apart from its context is bad science because it has vio
lated the nature of the reality it is studying.
The point here is that for Kohut and Kegan the study of the
11

other 11 is equally important as the study of the self, and, stated

more accurately, the development of the self/other relationship is
what psychological development is about.

But for now, a brief
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synopsis of the other and its functions, treated as though the
11

other 11 were a separate entity, may be helpful.

In self psychology,

the 11 other11 performs three ongoing functions to create a nurturing
environment for the emerging self.
The first function is mirroring, which became a richly elabo
rated construct for Kohut.
reflection.

It is, of course, much more than accurate

It includes the gleam in the mother's eye when she is

holding the infant, holding in her eyes, hands, and mind.

It is a

participatory mirroring that shares in and expresses the infant's
earliest experiences and communicates them as delightful and valued.
It is the numerous ways of confirming and affirming the infant's
sense of existence in a positive and welcoming context which lays the
earliest foundation of self-esteem.

In the subtle interactions and

intricate dialogue of self and selfobject, the self, through the
process of transmuting internalization, firms up what already exists
in potential inside itself.
1

1

But it must see and experience itself

externalized 11 and confirmed in the mirroring in order to take in and

own what is already there in potential.
Without mirroring the infant could develop neither the aware
ness that he or she existed nor that his or her existence was desira
ble and worthy as an ongoing project.

Inadequate mirroring may re

sult in the child's inability to build and strengthen the internal
structure required to regulate his or her own self-esteem.

Patholog

ical mirroring can result in distorted internal self structure that
causes the individual to relate to others in ways that perpetuate low
self-esteem.

Throughout life an individual experiences the
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environment as mirroring and thus confirming essential aspects of the
self.

In the healthy person the majority of the mirroring reflects a

positive self, sustained by its own as well as other's feedback.

One

demonstration of an unhealthy self is its uncanny ability to get
itself reflected in consistently negative ways.
The second function of the other is to provide an idealizable,
strong, safe, problem-solving model with whom the self can partially
merge in its first efforts to meet the exigencies of existence.

As

with the mirroring, it is an external object with whom the infant can
participate in such a way as to experience the internal psychic func
tioning that produces calmness and comforting.

As the self matures

this function operates less in terms of merged psychic functioning
and more in terms of a separate self learning from the modeling of an
idealized other.

As with mirroring, the need for idealization con

tinues throughout life, as in mentoring and symbolic ideals.
The third function of the other is to provide a connection in
reciprocal relationship that confirms a sense of alikeness and be
longing with others.

These are Kohut's twinship or alter ego needs.

This function of the other developed late in Kohut's experience and
theory, perhaps because the developing self does not rely upon and
call out these needs from others until the later stages of its devel
opment (the school years).

Much of Kohut's clinical work was with

more primitive, pre-Oedipal issues.

The development of skills and

talents, and what these competencies mean to the developing self, are
later developments of the self.

In any case, according to Kohut, the

maturing self requires from the environment some ongoing feedback
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that reflects its self-concept (with its skills and talents in ac
tion, as in sports or a career) as being like some others, as belong
ing to a group of similarly minded and behaving people.
Finally, it should be noted that all three of these functions
of the other provide a key ingredient required for the internaliza
tion of psychological structure--"optimal frustration."

This concept

of Kohut is central to his view of normal psychological growth as
well as growth that occurs in the course of therapy. This concept
will be explained in more detail in the next chapter.
Developmental Stages
As mentioned, self psychology does not currently have an elabo
rated stage by stage conceptualization of the sequential shifts in
the self-selfobject configuration. The developmental line of selfob
ject relations as viewed by Kohut appears to be a mixture of psycho
sexual and object relations elements and conceptions. During the
first year of life the self and the experience of the self is essen
tially inseparable from the "benignly facilitating influence of an
empathically attuned caretaker" (Wolf, 1980, p. 123).

Towards the

end of the first year, marked by such behavior as the onset of
stranger anxiety, the precursors of the self begin to consolidate
with enough cohesion to reflect an ongoing center of initiative in
volved in its own life project.

During the second year, with ade

quate parenting, the increments of psychic structure strengthen to
the point where, towards the end of the second year, the emergent
self is viable enough for the first stage of actual self-selfobject
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relations.
The task at this time for the emerging self is to establish and
maintain its boundaries within the context of its selfobject milieu
and to experience some mastery over some aspect of its bodily func
tioning.

Since both of these issues involve separating out the expe

rience of the self and some aspects of its functioning that were
formerly experienced as part of the selfobject, this process involves
some conflict and struggle.

The challenge for the emerging self is

to accomplish this transformation without losing the selfobject's
continued availability for mirroring and idealization.

Wolf (1980)

explained this conflict and ambivalence in self psychology concepts:
The boundaries are strengthened within the context of self
object relationships by drawing on the aid of the confirm
ing selfobject as an ally while simultaneously confronting
the selfobject as an antagonist against whom self-assertion
mobilizes healthy aggression that promotes the cohesive
strength of the self. These contradictory needs for an
ally-antagonist selfobject account for the inevitable am
bivalence of this phase of development. These contradic
tions color all subsequent relations and, in general, im
part a dialectical element to the human enterprise.
(pp. 125-126)
The first node, then, is prototypical in that it is the first primi
tive experience of a self that is in some way separate from its envi
ronment and yet connected with it, establishing a lifelong dialectic
of tension between two poles.
As the maturing self increases in capacity to relate to the
selfobject as a separate object (although at a primitive level of
this distinction), it also increases its capacity to differentiate
one selfobject from another, a capacity that had its first level
consolidation at the time of the appearance of stranger anxiety.
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Now, at the three and four year level this capacity increases in
complexity and strength as the child extends the selfobject milieu to
both parents as well as siblings.

The earlier ambivalence towards a

single selfobject may now be ameliorated by differentiating the ally
antagonist need onto separate selfobjects.

Although Kohut viewed

this era of development as sexually tinged, it is not ultimately
driven by sexual desire for the opposite sex parent and the conse
quent aggression towards the same sex parent.

The motivation is

still based on the developing self's need to maintain a sense of
coherence while balancing the polar needs of separateness and connec
tion, and these needs may be played out in various ways including
times of switching back and forth between the parents as to the ally
and the antagonist.
The significant shift that occurs in basic self-selfobject
relations at this time is the shift from the tight, closed, concrete,
dyadic type of relationships typical of the pre-Oedipal child to the
expanded use of various selfobjects to meet the mirroring, idealiz
ing, and twinship needs of the maturing self.

The capacity to shift

the nature of the selfobject from concrete, dyadic units to triadic
and multiple forms and connections (what might be called a selfobject
field) requires the increased firmness and coherence of internal self
structure that can maintain itself across a field of selfobjects.
The archaic need for an exclusive, concrete selfobject is mitigated
at this time, setting the foundation for the continued socialization
and maturing of the child's lifelong selfobject connections.
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During adolescence another significant shift occurs in which
the primary source of self-esteem is switched from the family context
to a peer context; and in addition, new forms of selfobjects such as
symbolic heroes, real heroes, ideals, and values emerge.

As the self

continues to mature by internalizing the values of idealized figures
and by strengthening its own talents and skills, and by realizing its
own ambitions in the supportive environment of family and peers, it
eventually builds a support system that includes these symbolic
values (for example, patriotism), identification with groups (career,
religion, politics), and gratification from accomplishing one's own
ambitions.

But the need for the selfobject as a source of nourish

ment, like the need for oxygen, is never outgrown.

Wolf (1980)

stated:
The progression of the developmental process also continues
so that by the time the adult has reached old age, he may
often have achieved a selfobject relation with the wider
world of mankind and beyond. Mature selflessness is really
the expansion of the self and its selfobjects to take in
the whole world. It is in this furthest development of the
line of selfobject relations that we can discern those
noble goals that are rooted in the transformations of in
fantile narcissism--the goals of wisdom and the acceptance
of transience. (p. 130)
Summary
Self psychology, although derived from clinical data (as is
psychoanalytic theory), puts forth a theory of healthy psychological
development couched very much in terms of self/other, relational
development.

As such it appears closely aligned with object rela

tions theories.

Unlike psychoanalytic theory it views the
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development of the self or ego in primarily positive motivational
terms.

That is to say, the motivation for development and for object

relations is not to satisfy biological instincts or psychological
drives but to realize and fulfill a "nuclear program" of a self that
is unique and uniquely related to others by its very nature and pro
gram.

Unlike many object relations theories in which the uniqueness

and separate qualities of the self tend to get deemphasized or lost
in the total commitment to the theoretical unit of the self/other,
and the self as a "unique center of initiative" is finally lost, self
psychology restores the self to a position of more prominence in the
self/environment balance.

The self, according to Kohut (1977), has

the potential for genuine creativity in the universe and can be de
scribed as having a measure of free will within its field of exist
ence.
Kegan
Theoretical Roots
As noted in the Chapter I, Kegan's (1982) constructive-develop
mental theory has its origins in Piaget's underlying framework of
"genetic epistemology," a framework attuned to both biology and phi
losophy.

In addition to the work of Piaget, Kegan viewed the origins

of his theory in the works of Baldwin (1906), Dewey (1938/1963), and
Meade (1934).

Kegan stated that his theory is based on "empirically

grounded speculation" (p. viii) and that he drew on a wide range of
observed human phenomena from his own and others' life experience,
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clinical experience, and research.

Although rooted in Piaget,

Kegan's theory is not merely an elaboration of Piaget's cognitive de
velopmental stages into what might be called the inner psychological
and experiential counterparts of these stages.

It is that and much

more, for Kegan sought to explore the implications of the "Trojan
horse" that he sees in Piaget's discoveries.

His point is that when

certain types of major new discoveries are made, whether it be Colum
bus discovering America or Freud discovering the unconscious, the
process of integrating this new knowledge with what was known before
requires an entire reorganization or re-cognition of the previously
known world.

Thus the new "part" does more than add to the whole; it

changes the whole.
For Kegan (1982), the "part" that Piaget discovered leads to the
bigger discovery of "the process of evolution as a meaning-constitu
tive activity" (p. 42).

Traditional attempts to conceptualize the

life force and how the individual develops within it have either
located the life force within the organism as a separate entity, an
essentially biologically autonomous system with its own instincts or
drives which require it to interact with its environment in order to
get its needs met (the view of psychoanalysis, genetic biology, or
sociobiology), or they have conceptualized the life force and located
the theater of action in the environmental surround (the view of
behaviorism), a view in which the individual organism is merely a
responding or reacting product of the complex external forces imping
; ng on it.
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Kegan (1982) suggested that Piaget's vision offers a third al
ternative which is difficult for the Western mind to even conceptual
ize.

He stated:
In fact, Piaget's v1s1on derives from a model of open
systems evolutionary biology. Rather than locating the
life force in the closed individual or the environmental
press, it locates a prior context which continually elabo
rates the distinction between the individual and the envi
ronment in the first place . . . . Its primary attention,
then, is not to shifts and changes in an internal equilib
rium, but to an equilibrium in the world, between the pro
gressively individuated self and the bigger life field, an
interaction sculpted by both and constitutive of reality
itself. (p. 43}
Kegan was suggesting that this eternal dialectic between the

organism and the environment, this assimilation and accorrmodation on
the part of each, "this evolutionary motion is the prior (or ground
ing) phenomenon in personality; that this process or activity, this
adaptive conversation, is the very source of, and the unifying con
text for, thought and feeling; that this motion is observable, re
searchable, [and] intersubjectively ascertainable" (p. 44}.
Furthermore Kegan suggested that this activity and motion which
form the ground or context for personality development as the self
evolves within its matrix is experienced by the self, and this expe
rience may be the very source of human emotions.

He stated, "Loss

and recovery, separation and attachment, anxiety and play, depression
and transformation, disintegration and coherence--all may owe their
origins to the felt experience of this activity, this motion to which
the word 'emotion' refers" (p. 44).
In offering this view of a wider context or prior ground from
which to view personality development, Kegan has attempted to expand
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the very perspective from which one observes the phenomena of human
development and then formulates theoretical explanations of the data.
He acknowledges that his approach is not "shy."

What his expanded

observational stance has allowed him to do is to view several of the
traditional dichotomies that have appeared as irreconcilable oppo
sites in different theories as having underlying unity or synthesis
by virtue of their being dialectical poles of a common unity rather
than mutually exclusive opposites.

From this vantage point such

questions as the following are poorly constructed questions and lead
eventually to dead ends:
cognition?

Which is master of personality, affect or

Which should be the central focus, the social or the

individual, the intrapsychic or the interpersonal? Which is the more
powerful framework, the psychoanalytic or the cognitive-structural?
New Perspectives
Kegan's use of the word meaning is a key to understanding his
approach towards synthesizing such dichotomized metapsychological
problems as those above.

When he took the broad context of the dia

lectical conversation between the organism and the environment and
narrowed it to his psychology of the evolving self, he referred to
the meaning-making of the individual.

It is in the evolution of

meaning-making that Kegan has sought to find a context which itself
is constitutive of the polarities mentioned above.

The self in its

dialectical motion and conversation with its environment is literally
a meaning-maker, that is, it makes meaning or sense out of its envi
ronment and its self, as it continually evolves from lesser stages to

41
more evolved forms of embeddedness with its environment by defining
and redefining itself in successively more articulated configura
tional relationships with its environment or "culture of embedded
ness." This self in evolvement can be understood as both a process
and an entity, both a meaning-making system which creates more and
more "self" as meaning or content and this made self which becomes
identified as the person. Thus Kegan referred to the meaning that .12_
the self and the meaning that is experienced in the process of con
stantly recreating a new self as both an "epistemological and onto
logical activity; it is about knowing and being, about theory-making
and investments and commitments of the self" (pp. 44-45).
It is this definition of the self as a meaning-maker and the use
of the term in two very different, in a sense contradictory, ways
that makes Kegan 1 s theory so difficult to grasp. Nevertheless, it is
this very stance, this philosophical and scientific viewpoint, that,
in this writer's understanding, is the heart of Kegan's theory.

It

is this approach which places Kegan as a scientist and theorist,
within the 20th-century approach to science and the increase of
knowledge.

It may be helpful for the reader attempting to maintain

conceptually the apparently opposing concepts of the self as entity
and the self as process, to think of them in the same way that one is
required to hold apparent opposites together in union in many other
modern relativistic concepts.

For example, light is viewed both as

particles and waves, and atoms are viewed as both energy and struc
ture.

It may require a sort of mental juggling or balancing act, but

then, to bring this philosophical abstraction down to immediate and
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experience-near reality, if one takes note of his or her experience
at any given moment, one can become aware of fact that he or she has
at the moment a given, fairly stable or constant sense of self (an
entity) and at the same time one is experiencing change and process
in this very moment.

There is no static self but a becoming, experi

encing, moving sense of reality in which the self and its environment
are part of a larger process.

To help the Western mind comprehend

this conception, Kegan {1982) said "we can begin by saying that it
does not place an energy system within us so much as it places us in
a single energy system of all living things" (p. 43).
It may be helpful to expand upon each of these aspects of the
meaning-making of the se 1f.

With respect to the "made meaning" as

pect, the self can be viewed at any given moment as a conscious and
knowing entity that has more or less found a way to make sense out of
things and has come to terms with this viewpoint.

It has found a way

of organizing experience in a somewhat stable framework of what con
stitutes the outside world and others, and what constitutes the in
side world, the self sense, and what interactions between these two
are all about.

This is the somewhat static or balanced state that

Kegan referred to as an evolutionary truce, a subject-object balance
which the self uses to organize and make sense out of experience.
This aspect emphasizes the cognitive and conceptual qualities of
knowing and meaning.

The Piagetian stages of development are de

scriptions of the successively more mature and differentiated ways of
perceiving and knowing that human development goes through, each
level being a wider perspective from which to view and know the self
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and the world.

This is the self that assimilates new experience into

its presently organized structure or set of "made meanings," its way
of perceiving and knowing.

But it is also this self that goes

through major upheavals in its organization, major accommodations to
experience that does not "compute in its old organization; or to use
more Piagetian language,

it

goes through processes of decentration 1
11

1

and recentration 11 during major developmental shifts.
11

It is especially during these transitional and stressful times
of reorganizing the frame or structure of one's made meaning, when
one's made meaning framework seems inadequate to meet new challenges,
that the second aspect of Kegan's notion of self as meaning-maker
comes to the foreground.

This is the self-as-process, and here the

focus is on what it means, in the sense of what the experience is
like, for the self to feel that its very existence is in motion, that
it is unfixed and unstable, the existence� at all times a process
of becoming as well as being.

The self-as-process is dealing with

what it means to make sense and then not to make sense, to feel a
sense of coherence and then the loosening of that coherence.

The

emphasis is not so much on the cognitive aspect of knowing and mean
ing but the affective experience of knowing such "meanings" as loss,
fragmentation, meaninglessness, and their attending negative emotions
such as fear and anxiety, as well as the counterparts of coherence,
attachment, and meaning, and the attendant positive emotions such as
peace, delight, and a sense of well-being.
For Kegan then, the ground or context of personality development
is this area of tension between the fixed and the changing, the

44
tension that the self experiences in the ongoing activity of assimi
lation and accommodation.

It is in the context or framework of this

field of tension that self experience occurs, resulting in the two
ways of meaning-making, the one more cognitive (like an existing
paradigm) and the other more affective (what it means to be this
always emerging process, always hanging in the balance, even if the
balance is sometimes relatively stable and sometimes unstable and
shifting).
Integration
It is through his complex view of the self as meaning-maker that
Kegan attempted to find some common ground between such theoretically
divided psychological traditions as existential-phenomenological
theories and neo-psychoanalytic theories, including ego psychologies
and object relations theories.

Although he made no formal effort to

integrate the theoretical differences between them, he suggested that
the constructive-developmental theory he put forth "ends up doing
honor to a surprising extent to the deepest convictions of both exis
tential and dynamic personality psychologies" (p. 4).

All of these

theories pay attention, according to Kegan, to the "zone of mediation
where meaning is made" and name this area variously as the "ego," the
"self," and the "person" (p. 3).

In other words, all of these theo

ries take as the proper domain of psychological study that intermedi
ate area between what is called an external event (by an observer),
and the reaction or response of a subject to that event, the private
area in which the person actually composes this experience into an
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event for him or her.

It is in this area that meaning is made of the

event by the subject, and it this subjective, psychological meaning,
whether cognitive or affective, experienced and to some extent creat
ed by the subject, that the psychologist seeks to understand and
thereby make sense out of human behavior.
Kegan suggested that although both the existential and the dy
namic traditions have greatly expanded our understanding of the self
as meaning-maker, each of these traditions is, "by itself, in diffi
culty" (p. 4).

He was suggesting that the basic convictions of each

theory appear to be helpful and valid psychological conceptions, but
they may have been taken as far as they can go within their own meta
psychological or philosophical frameworks.

According to Kuhn (1962),

each of these traditions could be said to be at that stage of scien
tific evolution when the theoretical structure which had served so
well to illuminate many previously unknown or unexplained phenomena
seems now to have run its course, having been employed as extensively
as possible in its field, and now its experimental applications seem
either to turn up no significantly new material or they turn up the
kind of new and anomalous material which appears to challenge or con
tradict the premises of the very theoretical structure that brought
the material to light.

Thus the need for a new and wider paradigm

under whose framework the anomalies can be studied while the old,
hard won knowledge, much of which will be retained, may need to be
reorganized and reintegrated in such a way as to change some of its
meaning.
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The "old knowledge" or basic convictions of the existential
tradition which Kegan's constructive-developmental approach honors
include the following:

First, there is the self-actualizing princi

ple as the sole motive of personality, a view so well developed by
Maslow (1954) and Rogers (1961).

Although Kegan rarely referred to

or elaborated an argument for the presumed motivation behind the
self's behavior, implicit in every aspect of his account of the self
as meaning-maker is the notion that the compelling force behind the
self's ongoing dialectical struggle with its environment is the
self's need to continuously reestablish or "actualize" who and what
it is in relation to its current amniotic surround.

The second basic

existential conviction Kegan retained is the old axiom that "exist
ence precedes essence." This is the understanding of the self as
process rather than entity. While Kegan may not be as radical as
some existentialists in this regard (recall his double and paradoxi
cal view of meaning described above), it is clear that his is funda
mentally a theory of motion, of process, rather than a static or
stage view of development. A third principle of agreement is that
the self or person in process is best viewed as a basic unity, an
integrated whole, which seeks to maintain and enhance itself as a
coherent whole and to act out of a sense of wholeness and integrity;
this is in contrast to views in which the self is part of a system, a
bundle of separate facets each with its own motivation and set in
inevitable conflict with each other.

In the unified view of the

self, anxieties, defenses, conflicts, and even psychopathology are
viewed as products created and established as efforts by a unified

..
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self system to maintain, enhance, or transform itself.
The limitations of these convictions which Kegan's approach
seeks to address include the following:

First, the self that is

"actualized" in the existential view is often described as though it
is one and the same self, or one "kind of self" that is always in the
process of self-actualizing.

Such a view does not pay attention to

the qualitatively different "self" that is being actualized at dif
ferent times, say at age 3 or 6 or 12 or 60.

Likewise, it does not

attend to the connections or ties between the earlier "selves" and
the later ones and how these ties impact on the experience of the
self at a given time.

In addition, the emphasis on the "one" self in

its existential moment takes no account of the commonality between
all persons, especially with respect to the regularities of its de
velopment and the commonalities of this regular development among
different individuals.
A second limitation of the existential view of development,
according to Kegan, is its tendency to vifw development in a linear
fashion from dependence to independence, with a strong bias towards
independence or autonomy as opposed to relatedness.

The construc

tive-developmental view, while maintaining the ever present motiva
tion for self-actualization in terms of greater and clearer differen
tiation from the other (and less dependence in the sense of being
embedded in the other), never loses sight of the equally important
motivation towards inclusion or connection with others, the quality
of this capacity to relate actually being enhanced by healthy indi
viduation.

Finally, Kegan suggested that the existential
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understanding of the function of the culturing environment, whether
this be the mother, the family, the wider culture, or the therapeutic
function in assisting the self to grow or heal or actualize is
vaguely delineated.

Rogers's (1961) many discussions of the "client

centered response" and his explanations of what constitutes "uncondi
tional positive regard" provide more "warmth than light" according to
Kegan (p. 6) when it comes to understanding what is really going on
in the self-other interaction and what might be needed from the
therapist or mother at different moments and in different phases of
the self's evolvement.
As stated above, Kegan also claimed to honor many of the basic
positions of neo-psychoanalytic theory (ego psychology and object
relations) with respect to viewing the self or ego as meaning-maker.
Guntrip (1971} and others have outlined the changes that the concept
of the ego or self has undergone within the history of psychoanalytic
theory.

Guntrip defined the essence of this change as a basic shift

from a systems-ego to a person-ego, and he traced this slow shift
through the words of Harry Stack Sullivan, Melanie Klein, Erik
Erikson, W. D. Fairbairn, Heinz Hartmann, D. W. Winnicott, and Edith
Jacobson.

Central to the view of personality development in these

theorists, according to Kegan, is the notion that ego or self devel
opment is intrinsically a product of the interaction of the organism
and its environment.

As a result, "the very essence of ego activity

� object relations, and ego activity is presumed to begin inmedi
ately at birth, rather than waiting for years to be hatched out of
prior and more powerful systems" (p. 7).

In addition, Kegan accepted
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the basic premise of neoanalytic theorists such as Erikson (1968) and
Kernberg (1966) that psychological development takes place through
predictable, successive evolutions of self-other stages.

Kegan

stated that his basic alignment with ego and object relations theo
rists lies in their colllTlon efforts 11 to understand the process and
stages of development in our self-other configurations 11 (p. 7).
As with the existential views, the neo-psychoanalytic views havP.
some built-in limitations and opposing dualities which Kegan sug
gested will require a larger perspective to resolve.
the three foremost of these:

1

1

He mentioned

the need for a sophisticated under

standing of the relationship between the psychological and the so
cial, between the past and the present, and between emotion and
thought 11 (p. 15).

Psychoanalytic theory has certainly emphasized one

side of each of these dualities:

the psychological (particularly the

intrapsychic dimension) as opposed to the social, the past as opposed
to the present, and affect over cognition.

As Kegan said, while

psychoanalytic theory has tended to be a theory about emotion, and
cognitive-developmentalism has tended to be a theory of cognition,
they each are theories of both, and each makes one the master and the
other the slave of personality.

Kegan stated that very little head

way has been made in the last 30 years with respect to these polari
ties, and that a larger metapsychology is required to bring about a
fruitful study of the tensions created by these polarities.

His

offering for that metapsychology is the constructive-developmental
approach, which takes the activity of meaning-making, within the
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context of the organism-environment struggle, as the fundamental
motion of personality development.
The Process
Having offered a brief summary of Kegan •s theoretical roots and
a short exposition of how his constructive-developmental theory re
lates to the main ideas in the existential-phenomenological and neo
psychoanalytic traditions, this overview now focuses on his actual
description and explanation of the developmental process.

Before

going into a description of the stages or "eras" that mark the suc
cessive constitutions of the self, it will be helpful to have an
understanding of how Kegan viewed the underlying process of evolution
itself.
For him, psychological development is ••a lifetime activity of
differentiating and integrating what is taken as self and what is
taken as other" (Kegan, 1982, p. 76).

One can begin to get the sig

nificance of that statement by distinguishing Kegan•s neo-Piagetian
view of infancy and the earliest emergence from virtual symbiosis
with the mother from the psychoanalytic object relations view of the
same phenomena.

From the psychoanalytic viewpoint the psychological

events of infancy are more than precedent setting, they are continu
ally operative and, especially in pathology, may be primary forces
motivating and shaping current behavior.

Especially around such

issues as separation and integration, the events of infancy set the
stage for and establish patterns for future personality structure and
behavior.

For Kegan, while the infancy experience is extremely
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important and may have a direct impact on later behavior in the sense
of establishing a poor foundation or setting a weak precedent, the
later problems are not just replays of repressed infancy issues but
are new and current wrestlings involving a higher level developmental
struggle with an issue--the current form of a differentiation issue-
that may have echoes of its infant cousin but is also an existential
experience of separation in its own right.

As Kegan stated, "While

early infancy has great importance from a neo-Piagetian view, it is
not, in its most fundamental respect, qualitatively different from
any other moment in the lifespan" (p. 77).
Another helpful way to begin to understand Kegan's view of de
velopment is through his view of the phenomena around the concept
known as object constancy and the earliest emergence of object relat
ing that occur during and after the achievement of object constancy.
From the psychoanalytic viewpoint the achievement of object constancy
appears to involve and perhaps follow upon an energy redirection from
the self (primary narcissism) to the object, now differentiated and
experienced as separate because it has become the object of an exter
nal focus of energy or libido.

The earliest form of object relations

are understood, then, as resulting from a withdrawal of attachment to
the self in favor of a new object outside the self.

For Kegan it is

the differentiation process itself, the evolutionary motion and
struggle of "hatching out" that creates both the cognitive shift or
maturation and the emotional value of the experience.

The dawn of

the object world is created by the infant as it participates in its
emergence from embeddedness in its culturing environment.

"By
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differentiating itself from the world and the world from it, the
organism brings into being that which is independent of its own sens
ing and moving" (p. 78).

Thus, the development of maturing object

relations might better be understood as resulting from "object crea
tion" rather than object choice.

It may appear that Kegan's view

emphasizes the perceptual and cognitive aspect of this process and
the psychoanalytic view concentrates primarily on the affective as
pect, but Kegan insisted that the emotions play an equally signifi
cant role in the process.

In fact, his whole point is that he has

been trying to pay attention to and view the entire process from a
prior and wider context-,-the evolutionary motion--that itself is
generative of both cognition and emotion.
But before addressing Kegan's (1982) view of the role of affect
in the process of achieving object constancy, it might be helpful to
offer the following quotations describing the essential nature of the
process as it is repeated with new content at various life junctures:
From a neo-Piagetian view, the transformation in the first
eighteen months of life--giving birth to object relations-
is only the first instance of that basic evolutionary ac
tivity taken as the fundamental ground of personality de
velopment. The infant's "moving and sensing, 11 as the basic
structure of its personality organization (the reflexes),
get "thrown from"; [Kegan's exegesis of the etymology of
object as that which gets projected from the subject] they
become the object of attention, the "content" of a newly
evolved structure. Rather than being my reflexes, I now
have them, and 11 ! 11 am something other. 11 ! 11 am that which
coordinates or mediates the reflexes, what we mean by
"impulses" and 11 perceptions. 11 This is the new subjectiv
ity. For the first time, this creates a world separate
from me, the first qualitative transformation in the his
tory of guaranteeing the world its distinct integrity, of
having it to relate to, rather than be embedded in.
( p. 79)
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This statement is a concise view of Kegan's theory from the perspec
tive of the developing person, a description of what it might be like
from the inside to grow through these changes.

The following quota

tion is a more general description of the same phenomena from the
outside:
The events of the first eighteen months culminate with the
creation of the object and make evolutionary activity
henceforth an activity of equilibration, of preserving or
renegotiating the balance between what is taken as subject
or self and what is taken as object or other. I suggest
that human development involves a succession of renegoti
ated balances, or "biologics," which come to organize the
experience of the individual in qualitatively different
ways. (p. 81)
This description of the process is complete in so far as it describes
what happens in development, but it does not include the meaning and
place of the emotions in the process.
What is actually happening in the psychological organization of
the person during this first stage of development and, indeed, at
every subsequent transitional phase of reorganizing and renegotiating
what is self and what is other amounts to the actual coming apart or
the disorganization of what was composed as self; the experience of
this disequilibrium results in the affective response of anxiety over
the loss of the coherence and organization of the old self.

If this

anxiety is severe (as in cases in which the supportive environment is
seriously deficient), depression may result; in extreme case the
trauma may be so great that the person may, in Kegan's words, turn
against his or her own life project.
Even in normal development, however, where there is appropriate
support from what Kegan called the life-surround, anxiety always
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accompanies the reorganization of the self and other.

The point here

is that Kegan has suggested that the very source of our emotions is
the evolutionary process, the experience 11 of defending, surrendering,
and reconstructing a center" (p. 82).

From this perspective what is

commonly known as separation anxiety takes on a remarkable new twist.
The usual view of separation anxiety is that it is the infant 0 s re
sponse to the loss of the object.

But since separation or stranger

anxiety is commonly observed to begin at around 8 or 9 months of age,
before the clear achievement of object constancy, the 11 object'' of
stranger or separation anxiety at this stage may not be experienced
as a separate object but still as partially fused with the self.

And

since the process of emerging from embeddedness as experienced by the
infant is a process of separating itself out from that which it was
previously merged with (in unawareness), the sudden disappearance of
what was until recently experienced as part of the self and is still
only partially differentiated, may be experienced as a loss of what
was the self.

Thus the process of transition from an old organiza

tion of the self and other to a new one is always a critical and
vulnerable time for the person.

It is a time when the very experi

ence of the self as an organized, meaningful, ongoing enterprise
appears to be in question.
It is for this reason that Kegan placed as much emphasis on the
importance of integration as he did on separation or differentiation
at each stage of development.

After separating out from some part of

what was the self, after ''throwing it out" or making what was subject
into object, it is crucial that what was part of the self be
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reintegrated into the new organization of the self.

Its reintegra

tion changes its meaning and function--it is now a part of the out
side, separate reality to which the self can be in relation.

But if

it is lost at the very time the self is differentiating from it, its
loss is actually experienced as a loss of some part of the self.
During the transition of an object's emergence from being fused with
the self to becoming distinct and separate from the self, there is a
need for a time of moving back and forth between merger and separa
tion, times of feeling fused, not fused, and transitional times in
between, until the maturing consciousness can hold the object as
separate, external, and reliably there to relate to.

The untimely

disappearance of the actual object during this time may give the
message to the self struggling to differentiate that this effort is
indeed a dangerous and even self-destructive process.

Growth, then,

would appear to involve irrecoverable loss (of what looks like the
object to an outside observer but what feels like part of the self to
the emerging self).
Thus far this presentation has dealt with the developmental
process primarily from the point of view of the developing infant or
self, but what about the equally important function of the environ
ment in this process?

Since this issue will be detailed in later

chapters, only the briefest summary will be provided here.

Kegan

placed great emphasis on the culturing environment, the amniotic
surround, as the equal dynamic partner in the evolutionary matrix.
The self and the current other, however it is constituted, are poles
in dynamic relation, each playing a major role in maintaining the
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current state of the other.

In essence, the two poles form a single

unit rather than separate entities.

It is easier to imagine this

formulation of the infant-environment relationship when the infant is
in utero or in its earliest extra uterine infancy (as with
Winnicott's "there's no such thing as a baby" perspective) than it is
to carry this perspective to the lifelong emerging evolutionary rela
tionship of the self to its environment.
of Kegan's (1982) psychology.

This is the radical quality

As he stated:

In Winnicott's view the "holding environment" is an idea
intrinsic to infancy. In my view it is an idea intrinsic
to evolution. There is not one holding environment early
in life, but a succession of holding environments, a life
history of cultures of embeddedness. They are the psycho
social environments which hold us (with which we are fused)
and which let go of us (from which we differentiate).
(p. 116)
Kegan defined three distinct functions that the culturing envi
ronment plays in the evolution of the self.

Although all functions

may be present and needed to some extent at all times, the three
functions are especially critical in a sequential pattern in response
to the periodic phases or self transformations that occur when the
self and other equilibrium becomes unbalanced, goes through the un
settling transitional time, and then reorganizes.

In a given balance

or somewhat stable phase, the primary function of the other is to
hold, confirm, and affirm the self as it is presently constituted.
This confirmation and holding contributes to the strengthening of the
self and the maturing of its capacities at a given stage.
The second function of the supporting culture is to assist in
the emergence or change of the self from a current level of
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organization to a more complex level entailing a more complex and
elaborated self and other relationship.

At these times the function

of the culture is to "contradict" the self's tendency to stay in or
regress to the old level of organization.

This contradiction is also

called a "letting go" by Kegan, and it involves the parents' letting
go of their old way of being connected to the child and thereby en
couraging the emerging independence of the child.

This is the deli

cate transition time when the self experiences a disintegration of
its old structure.

It may respond in contradictory ways to the in

tended "supportive" letting go of the parent, at one time feeling
this letting go as loss of support (as when the parent lets go of the
bicycle and the child becomes frightened and crashes), and at other
times feeling the letting go as supportive of and a demonstration of
faith in the child's capacity to ride on his or her own.

The emerg

ing self may experience significant upheaval and present quite a
challenge for the supporting other, who is trying to both encourage
the leading edge of the emergent self (with its attendant anxiety)
and perhaps discourage some of the old behaviors.

In performing this

sensitive and difficult function, it is important to keep in mind
that it is not just the emerging self who is undergoing change, but
the parent (or other half of the unit) is undergoing an equally sig
nificant change, the "other" is also remaking and reorganizing its
meaning and its way of being in relation to the chilrl.
The third function of the culture is the counterpart to the
critical process of reintegration that was described above.

After

the transition to a new and more mature self-other configuration, the
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new self may find it necessary for a while to push away from and even
repudiate the aspect of the other that was made object, and from
which the self is now differentiated.

This may be necessary during

the late transitional time and for a time afterward in order to in
sure the new boundary, the sense of separation and independence, and
to avoid the danger of feeling as though it is being reabsorbed into
the old way of being connected with the culture.

Thus the 2-year-old

in the latter stage of the primal separation from that which is "not
me'' or the adolescent in differentiating from some identity values
that are "not me," may have to be somewhat negative, noisy, and in
sistent about being its new self and not being the old.

The impor

tant function of the culture at this time, and one that is often
overlooked in developmental theories, is to allow itself to be repu
diated without retaliating or rejecting or leaving the newly emerged
self.

Only by patiently "staying in place," as Kegan put it, can the

holding and supportive other fulfill its third function and allow the
new self to eventually complete its reorganization process by coming
to terms with the new other that it has "created" by differentiating
from it.

When the new self forges a new relationship with this new

form of the other, a reintegration of the other has taken place, but
if the other does not stick around for this process or rejects the
efforts of the new self to relate to it, the process may be seriously
hindered and remain incomplete, and, as stated above, the message to
the self may be that growth towards independence involves irrecover
able loss.
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Two Motivations
A final way of looking at the polarities is necessary before
presenting a description of the stages of development. It is part of
the wider perspective that Kegan offered that allowed him to claim
that his theory is both interpersonal and intrapsychic. (And in this
claim lies the central rationale for this study--that the interper
sonal and intrapsychic viewpoints need not remain totally separate
viewpoints with no hope of developing a common language.)

The basic

polarity described above is seen as the fundamental biological as
well as social and psychological reality of the organism always ex
isting within a life-surround, a biosociopsycho 11 amniotic field, so
11

to speak. This polarity creates the context of evolutionary motion,
and the tension within it is a manifestation of the energy or life
force that facilitates the continuous emergence of organisms from
their current embeddedness. However, when one begins to work with
this view of development, there is the constant tendency to think in
terms of the duality of the observer versus the observed, as though
this is a theory about developmental reality as taking place in the
context of two poles (the self or child and its environment) which
are external to the observer-researcher-theorist and as such consti
tute ''objective reality."

The intrapsychic claim of this theory is

that these poles also exist within the psychic experience of the
self. That is to say, there is a self-other polarity experienced as
an internal dialectic tension, the manifestation of which is observed
in human behaviors that demonstrate two lifelong needs that appear to
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be opposed--the need to belong, to be included, and the need to be
separate and independent.

It is by taking account of these needs,

and the presumed intrapsychic motivation and development that occurs
in relation to them--the yearnings for them and the fears and anxie
ties associated with losing and restoring them--that Kegan's theory
can make the claim of being an intrapsychic theory, for these are the
primary phenomena of psychodyn�ic drive and defense theory.

Kegan

wrote of the psychologies favoring inclusion and the psychologies
favoring independence.

The psychologies favoring inclusion are

grounded in the phenomenological experience of the self as always
being a part of a larger reality, which results in the psychological
need or motivation to belong, to be connected, and to have meaning in
relation to the other; the loss of this experience results in the
profound anxiety of feeling isolated, unconnected, cut off, of having
no meaning in relation to something else.

The psychologies favoring

independence are grounded in the phenomenological experience of being
a separate entity, which results in the psychological need to main
tain personal boundaries, to be separate and distinct; the loss of
this experience results in the profound fear of being swallowed up or
totally fused with and thereby lost.

These two needs or yearnings

play the major motivating roles in the self's development.

Kegan's

developmental model rests on the assumption that the self forms its
successive self-other balances in alternate favorings of one or the
other side of the inclusion-independence polarity.

What psychologi

cal development amounts to, then, is a progressive series of emerg
ings from a given stage of deeper embeddedness, through a relatively
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unstable period of transition, to the next stage of lesser embedded
ness, each of these relatively stable stages or eras or evolutionary
truces being settled in favor of, and alternately so, the psycholog
ies of inclusion and the psychologies of independence.
The Model and the Stages
The model that Kegan (1982) used to visualize the developmental

journey is the helix (see Figure 1).
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The helix is chosen to represent the lifelong back and forth
struggle between psychologies favoring inclusion (the right side of
the helix) and independence (the left side), and to demonstrate the
equal value and part that each plays in development, in contrast to
most developmental theories, which favor growth towards independence
at the expense of integration and inclusion, and tend to view that
growth in a linear progression towards independence, rather than
alternating between dependence and independence.
The infant begins life in the incorporative state, being virtu
ally one with or totally embedded in his or her environment, from a
psychological point of view.
tive era.

Kegan called this time the incorpora

The essential work of this era is the psychological

"hatching out" (to use Mahler, Pine, & Bergman's, 1975, metaphor).
During this time the psychological embeddedness of the infant is in
the reflexes, sensing, and moving.

In other words, the infant's

experience, its sense of reality, is in reflexing, sensing, and mov
ing.

The infant does not so much have these qualities as he or she

is these things, a distinction of that which is subject and that
which is object that Kegan makes at every level of development.

The

external culture of embeddedness during this time, as viewed from an
objective perspective, is the mother or primary caretaker.

From the

infant's point of view its reflexes, senses, and movements are first
experienced as fused with, or at least in fluid boundary states with
respect to the culturing environment.
From an outside perspective the hatching out work of this era
appears to result in the emerging or birth of an infant, a
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primitively differentiated self, but from the inside the perspective
is about the birth of the object, of a world that is separate and
remains separate from the child's sensing and moving.

The psycholog

ical shift or maturation that takes place in this emergence is that
the reflexes and senses shift from their subjective fusion with the
infant to a place of objective awareness on the part of the child.
In other words, the child no longer� his or her reflexes, instead
he or she has reflexes.

And by virtue of this shift, this psycholog

ical maturation, the infant gains some control over the reflexes and
sensing.

The infant can take some perspective on the experience of

having sensations rather than just being them.
As mentioned above, the role of the culturing environment re
tains the same underlying structure and purpose throughout all eras
of development, and its three, generally sequential, functions are
holding, letting go, and staying in place.

In early infancy the

holding would involve empathic attunement with the reflexes of the
infant.

Needs such as food, touching, actual holding, and eye to eye

mirroring constitute some aspects of the function of holding or con
firming required at this time.

The letting go (contradicting) func

tion would include less irmiediate responses to all reflexive needs,
reducing carrying, and encouraging initial efforts and moves of inde
pendent actions.

The staying in place would involve the primary

caretaker's capacity to still be there and still function as an ulti
mate source of security and soothing, especially in moments of fear
or hurt, but also to stay in place as the child moves to extend his
or her world of attachments to include others, perhaps the larger
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family, baby sitters, and others.

While still primary, the main

caretaker would allow and support a shift to being one among many
rather than being exclusive.
One additional function of the culturing environment that has
not been mentioned up to this point is the 11 medium of transition 11
(Kegan, 1982, p. 118).

This is very similar to Winnicott's (1965)

transitional object. 11

The meaning of the transitional object from

1

1

the point of view of the emerging self, is that it is comprised of a
paradoxical mixture of what was the old self and what is the newly
constituted self.

As such, during a transitional time, the child

uses this object as a bridge, since it is connected to the old way of
being (and can provide some of the old feelings, the security of the
old way of being) and to the new way of being (it is in some ways
separate from the child and can be taken as object).

As object, it

can even be actively repudiated at times (the 11 not me") or it can be
related to (as separate from me).

Typical transitional objects for

the shift from the incorporative era to the impulsive one are teddy
bears and blankets.
The first differentiated era, or Stage 1, is called the impul
sive era; the previous era, the incorporative, is called Stage 0.
Stage 1 is the relatively balanced evolutionary truce that comes with
the permanent birth of the object (object constancy).

Now that the

object world exists, the normal maturing process involves a new at
tachment, a new embeddedness in a qualitatively different amniotic
sac--the family environment.

The new psychological embeddedness is

in the impulses and perceptions.

The child virtually

J.2. its

impulses

65

and perceptions, that is, he or she lives through and experiences
through the media of the impulses and perceptions.

He or she is

subjective to them and can take no perspective on them.

For a child

at this stage the world changes with his or her perception of it, as
was so effectively demonstrated in Piaget's experiments with the
child's perception of the amount of water increasing as it was poured
from a short, fat glass to a tall, thin glass.
As at every stage, the external world is only partially differ
entiated and partly fused.

As the Stage O infant could confuse the

working of its own reflexes and senses with its culture of embedded
ness, so the Stage 1 child can confuse the working of its own im
pulses with that of its current culture--the people in its family.
The appropriate and needed holding and confirming at this time would
take the form of honoring the child's impulses and perceptions, of
allowing fantasies and actions based on these impulses to have some
free play and support from the environment.

Included in these impul

sive behaviors would be times of intense attachments and also intense
rivalries.
The lack of impulse control demonstrated by the preschooler is
understood, then, not as a deficiency but as an inevitable state of
things when the child is embedded in his impulses and perceptions.
This can help explain the rage reactions of a child whose impulses
are blocked, for, as Kegan (1982) said, "When I am subject to my
impulses, their nonexpression raises an ultimate threat; they risk
who I am" ( p. 88) .
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It is obvious, however, that the culturing environment cannot
and should not support all of the impulses and perceptions of the
child.

That would contribute to the establishment of grandiosity and

perhaps narcissism.

The second supportive function--letting go or

contradicting--creates a context for the initial moves that eventuate
in shifting the child out of this first stage or balance of self and
other.

It requires such things as holding the child responsible for

his impulses and actions, of excluding him from the marriage bed, and
encouraging small examples of self sufficiency and independence.
The actual transition towards the next balance or truce often
corresponds with the first school experience--perhaps preschool,
kindergarten, and first grade.

This shift of the culture of embed

dedness from the family to the larger environment of the school re
quires for its support the staying in place of the family culture.
If the child is to successfully cross the bridge from one environment
to the next, it is crucial for the child to find the family there
when he or she returns.

Without this staying in place, the family

that before was intrinsic to who the child was (part of his or her
subjectivity), cannot be made into object, one part of the new and
larger external world, and integrated into the new and more evolved
self system.

Thus Kegan wrote of the danger of family dissolution at

the time that the child is differentiating from the family.

This

again would raise the old specter that growth and differentiation
entails unrecoverable loss, loss of something that was partially
constituted as the self.
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A medium of transition for this stage is often one or more imag
inary friends.

The imaginary friend is part of the old me and can be

the repository of the old impulses which the emerging child is strug
gling to gain control over.

It is actually the reining in of the

impulses, having impulses rather than being them, that gives the
growing child a new sense of control a-Ad power.

The capacity to

chose whether or not to act on an impulse is experienced as a tri
umph, and to fall back into being the slave of the impulses can be
experienced as losing control.

Thus the imaginary friend may get the

blame for occasional lapses into what is now considered unacceptable
behavior.
As noted earlier, Kegan's view of the evolution of the self
within a context of self-other polarities is driven by two great
human yearnings--the desire for inclusion, connection, and belonging,
and the opposing desire for independence and separateness.

It was

also noted that development consists of self-other balances that
alternate between those being resolved in favor of inclusion and
those resolved in favor of independence.

As development moves up the

helix model from the incorporate era, which is placed in the center
and called Stage 0, the move is in a curve to the right side of the
helix, which represents Stage 1, the impulsive era.
is towards inclusion.

The first move

After primary differentiation, the need is to

be safely and fully immersed in the arms of the family.

Thus the

first self-other balance that is negotiated is resolved in favor of
inclusion with the other.

This is not a conscious need but rather an

underlying need or condition that is simply a prerequisite for
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healthy development at this time.

Awareness of it would be brought

about mostly by its inadequacy or loss.
The first transition across the helix to a self-other truce in
favor of independence leads to Stage 2, called the imperial era.

The

settling in of this balance in the early school years is signified by
what Kegan called a "sealing up" or a "self-containment" of the
youngster.

He or she now has a private world and does not always let

the parent in.

Boundaries between the self and other are in place,

and the young child has a clear measure of control and agency regard
ing himself or herself, with impulses and perceptions under some
control and integration, and actions appearing much more planned and
deliberate.

There is a growing stability around a self-concept, not

merely that I am (as Stage 1), but what I am, a person with some
defined preferences and dispositions.
If the Stage 1 balance was about the birth of the object, Stage
2 is about the birth of the role.

The holding and confirming func

tion of the culture, both at home and at school, is to recognize and
confirm the role of the child.

The child's experience of himself or

herself now is primarily in terms of the role that he or she plays in
the family, the school, and with peers.

During these years great

growth takes place in terms of skills and competence development.
Again the holding function has the job of supporting the self
sufficiency, the independence, the role-taking, and the competence
and confidence building of this era.
What makes this era imperial is the pronounced self-sufficiency,
the absence of shared reality, the emphasis on one's own needs and
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interests at the expense of others.

If the child now has impulses

(the impulses are under control), the new subjectivity is his or her
own needs and interests--the child is his or her needs and interests
and therefore others are also counted very much in terms of how they
serve the needs and interests of the child.

Eventually the forces

from within (the yearning for inclusion again after a time of pro
nounced independence) and the forces from without (the contradicting
and letting go function of the culturing environment) create pressure
to move from a balance of unqualified self-interest towards a shift
to mutuality, of taking the needs and interests of others into ac
count.

More and more the child is required to hold up his or her end

of relationships.
The shift from Stage 2 to Stage 3 can be especially difficult
for many adolescents.

As mentioned before, the loss of an estab

lished and hard won truce with the world is usually attended with
considerable stress and turbulence.

It is experienced as a loss of

the self in that the old way of making meaning out of the self and
world is indeed coming apart.

Adolescents may feel that their very

identity and independence are being taken from them if they are
forced to include the needs, interests, and rights of others in their
deliberations and decisions.

The peer culture is especially impor

tant at this time, and the staying in place function of the old cul
ture--the home, the school, and the peer group--is important.

Kegan

suggested that relocation of the family is especially disruptive of
this function.

The transitional object that may help the adolescent

to bridge the transition from the imperial era to the next one, the
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interpersonal, may be a special chum, someone whose needs and inter
est were identical to the adolescent's, but who now serves the func
tion of one whom the developing person may also observe objectively,
as though looking at the way he or she was, and often still is, and
thereby being able to take some perspective on the needs and inter
ests that were experienced as ultimates.

This growing capacity to

take a perspective on the needs assists in the beginning of the
shifting of the needs from subject to object, from being one's needs
to having needs that can be integrated with the needs of others.
The next balance, Stage 3, is a shift back to the inclusion side
of the helix.

This interpersonal era has its embeddedness in mutu

ality, often in intense one-to-one relationships.

In this culture of

mutuality there is a capacity for collaborative self-sacrifice.
There is an intense need to be in a shared space, a shared subjective
experience.

In this era the sense of self is located in the inter

personal matrix, and the loss of the other can feel like the loss of
all self-meaning.

Conflict in this era is not really conflict be

tween two parts of the self or between self and other, but between
the self as part of one shared context and the self as part of an
other shared context--Will this friend be mad at me if I do something
with that friend?
The contradiction or letting go function for this era is per
formed by the person who will not allow him or herself to be fused
but still seeks to maintain a positive association.

This type of

person demonstrates the possibility of relating while maintaining
independence, and insists that the over-included friend assert some
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independence and initiative.

The risk at this time is that the in

terpersonal partner will leave or reject at the very time the previ
ously overly dependent person is just beginning to risk some inde
pendence.

The transitional object that often helps a person across

the transition from the overly included interpersonal era to the next
independence-favored era, the institutional, is a temporary job,
going to college, or a military stint.
In Stage 4, the institutional era, the culture of embeddedness
is personal autonomy, self authorship, the self as the administrator
of a self-system.

The supporting confirmation comes in terms of

admission to a group or profession in which the self is guiding its
own ship.

It is experienced as self authoring as it integrates work,

marriage, family, and interests.

The self can be viewed as an insti

tution with its own reason for being, its own rules and beliefs, and
its own organizational style.
can be very self-contained.

This self, like its imperial cousin,
It may feel threatened by any intrusion

into its domain or any demands that it subordinate its interests to
another.
As for all eras Stage 4 has its limit or constraint.

The self

here cannot see beyond its own ideological definition of itself.
cannot take a perspective on its own system.

It runs the risk of

maintaining its self-government at the expense of those around it.
The contradicting function of the culture that encourages growth
beyond this stage would include the insistence of a partner, for
example, on being included as partner and not being a subordinated
part of the other's system.

It would mean the relativizing of the

It
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identification with a system, a set of conventions or beliefs, to a
position beyond identification with any one system, institution, or
government.

The loosening of this identification allows for the

possibility of true intimacy with others, for the self as a separate
system is no longer threatened by considerations of and sharing with
those of different persuasions.

This kind of sharing does not mean

the disintegration of the old system, but a loosening of narrow
identification with it.

The new self can actually be above all sys

tems, but enjoy its chosen relationship with its old system while
enhancing its experience in that system by the cross fertilization of
other systems.
Kegan called this highly evolved Stage 5 the interindividual
stage.

The embeddedness is a culture of intimacy (not fusion) in

which individuality is retained and enhanced.

This interpenetration

of systems supports and enhances true individuation in work and love
as it creates a mutual and reciprocal culture in which each individu
al is supported by and supports the other�
balance of self and other is achieved.

At this stage a true

All previous balances were

actually somewhat imbalanced (tipped in favor of inclusion or inde
pendence) and therefore temporary and unstable.

The achievement of

the interindividual level creates a self that is above all the other
selves and coordinates and integrates them.

It no longer� any

limited set of needs, relationships, or career definitions.

It has

all these and therefore can participate in all the others from a
perspective that can view the good of all without threat to its self
definition.

With others who have achieved a similar perspective,
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such a person can unite to create true corrmunity, a corrmunity that
maintains a supportive context for the continuing development of all
the emerging persons within it.

CHAPTER III
CONCEPT COMPARISON
Definitions of Self
Since the term self is central in the writings of both Kegan and
Kohut, it seems fitting to begin this analysis and comparison of
their basic concepts by defining and distinguishing their respective
conceptualizations of the self.

First, it should come as no surprise

that Kohut 1 s use of the term self has several implications that are
far more theoretically intricate and philosophically weighted than
Kegan I s use of the term.

After all, Kohut I s 11 self 11 is the intra

psychic centerpiece of a new paradigm in psychoanalytic theory,
whereas Kegan's 1 1 self 11 is primarily a descriptive reference to the
organism or individual as an experiencing component in the evolving
self-other dyad.

Kegan's use of self would generally be interchange

able with such terms as person, organism, or, on a more psychological
plane, ego.
Kohut
Kohut (1977) distinguished between his earlier psychology of the
self in the "narrower sense 11 and his later elaboration of the psy
chology of the self in the 1 1 broader sense. 11

In the narrower sense

the self is conceptualized as contents of the mental apparatus, a
view that was essentially compatible with classic structural theory.
74
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However, when used in the broader sense, the self is understood to
constitute the center of the psychological universe, and "the concept
of the self is supraordinated to that of the mental apparatus and its
agencies" (p. 228), and furthermore, it is a "supraordinated configu
ration whose significance transcends that of the sum of its parts"
(p. 97).

From such statements as these and references to a 11 nuclear

self" that seeks to fulfi11 its innate program one begins to get an
anthropomorphized sense of Kohut's 11 self. 11
Chessick (1985) contrasted Kohut's definition of self with that
of Meade, for whom the mind and self arise out of social interaction
and have no innate separate existence.

For Kohut the self, while

always requiring the interaction with its environment to maintain and
to develop its own unique potential, nevertheless seems to have qual
ities and properties that are not entirely products of its inter
actions.

Chessick made note of Kant's distinction between the

"noumenal" and the "phenomenal" self, that is, between the self as an
experience-distant entity with some sort of "essence" or being, and
the experiential, empirical flow of self states in a string of exis
tential moments.

Chessick suggested that Kohut often slips into the

noumenal sense when speaking of the self but that his self should not
be equated with a noumenal self (in religious terms, a soul).

Kohut

(1978) himself distinguished his view from Kant's noumenal self.

The

self for Kohut always retains psychological, experience-near quali
ties, available to the "scientist" through the tools of empathic
introspection.

In addition, unlike the noumenal self, Kohut's self

retains the characteristic of having unconscious contents and
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structure.
Kohut 1 s (1977) own views regarding defining the self cannot be
better explained or sulTITiarized than in this lengthy statement:
My investigation contains hundreds of pages dealing with
the psychology of the self--yet it never assigns an inflex
ible meaning to the term self, it neve� explains how the
essence of the self should be defined. But I admit this
fact without contrition or shame. The self . . . is, like
all reality--physical reality (the data about the world
perceived by our sense) or psychological reality (the data
about the world perceived via introspection and empathy)-
not knowable in its essence. We cannot, by introspection
and empathy, penetrate to the self per se; only its intro
spectively or empathically perceived psychological manifes
tations are open to us. Demands for an exact definition of
the nature of the self disregard that fact that 11 the self 11
is not a concept of an abstract science, but a generaliza
tion derived from empirical data. Demands for a differen
tiation of self and self representation 11 (or, similarly,
of self and a sense of self are, therefore, based on a
misunderstanding. We can collect data concerning the way
in which the set of introspectively or empathically per
ceived inner experiences to which we later refer as 11 I 11 is
gradually established, and we can observe certain charac
teristic vicissitudes of this experience. We can describe
the various cohesive forms in which the self appears, can
demonstrate the several constituents that make up the
self--its two poles (ambitions and ideals) and the area of
talents and skills that is interposed between the two
poles--and explain their genesis and functions. And we
can, finally, distinguish between various self types and
can explain their distinguishing features on the basis of
the predominance of one or the other of their constituents.
We can do all that, but we still will not know the essence
of the self as differentiated from its manifestations.
(pp. 310-311)
II

II

II

II

II

II

11)

Guntrip (1971) has traced the struggle within psychoanalytic
theory that brought about the conceptual shift from a system-ego
(Freud 1 s weak clown attempting to modulate biologically based drives
far superior in strength and significance) to a person-ego, a whole
self, which can only thrive, especially in infancy, within the matrix
of a supportive object relational context.

The theorist who took
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this shift to its logical extreme was Fairbairn (cited in Guntrip,
1971), and his view of the "whole true self," which is present from
the beginning of life, and the "unitary dynamic ego" are perhaps the
closest one can come in the literature to Kohut 1 s view of the self.
Guntrip stated that Freud did not start with the concept of a whole
person, but for Fairbairn, "The baby starts life as a whole psychic
self however primitive and undeveloped and undifferentiated"
(p. 92).
Kegan
One does not get the same sense of the self as a "center of
initiative" in Kegan 1 s (1982) writings, that is, a unique entity with
its own will or intentionality about its unique life project.

Never

theless, in Kegan 1 s view of the self there is the same attempt to
bridge the gap between the self as content or image and the self as
person, or between the noumenal and phenomenal concepts of the self.
In his view of man as meaning-maker he sometimes seemed to be speak
ing of the "meaning made," which would be the content self, the self
with its current self concept or identity, its self-recognized atti
tudes, characteristics, and relatively stable behavior patterns and
disposition.

When he used the term this way, it seems similar to

Kohut 1 s use of the self in the "narrower" sense, that is, a content
of the mental apparatus.

But more often Kegan seemed to be speaking

of the self as process, or motion, not as a separate psychic entity
but as the consciousness capacity of the experiencing organism whose
evolutionary emergence from psychological embeddedness with its
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surround results in increasingly higher forms of consciousness.

Con

sciousness seems to be a by-product derived from the activity of the
self rather than the ground and nature of the self.

Consciousness is

described primarily in terms of levels and experiences of self and
other differentiation as described above in the "stages" that compose
various constitutions of the self-other balance.

In short, for Kegan

the self appears to be a psychological product of evolutionary activ
ity.

He stated:
For we are not our stages; we ar.e not the self who hangs in
the balance at this moment in our evolution. We are the
activity [italics added] of this evolution. We compose our
stages, and we experience this composing. Out of this
evolutionary motion, which we are [italics added], we expe
rience emotion (this is what the word means--ex + motion:
out of, or from, motion). Any theory of emotlon must begin
by naming that motion it regards as the source. I have
named my candidate. Feeling may be the sensation of evolu
tion; more complexly, the phenomenology of personality in
its predicament as self-constituting meaning-making.
(p. 169)

From a philosophical standpoint there appear to be substantial
differences between Kegan's and Kohut's views of the self, Kegan's
falling more clearly into an existential-phenomenological framework,
and Kohut's definition seeming to at least allow for a self in terms
of an essence or ongoing entity, even though that essence can never
be directly known or even conceptually defined.
These philosophical differences, however, are not fundamental
obstacles with respect to the compatibility or even the integration
of their respective psychological views of the self.

In both cases

the field of study is the ongoing, experiential self, whether the

data are derived, as in Kohut's case, from empathic introspection, or
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in Kegan•s case, from observation and the self reports of the person.
What is different, however, in their theorizing about the self
is that Kohut•s is an intrapsychic theory of the self, and Kegan•s is
an interpersonal or psychosocial view of the self.

Thus, when Kohut

spoke of the self and its vicissitudes, he was speaking conceptually
of complex intrapsychic structure (the bipolar or tripolar self as
previously outlined) and how the experience of the self (cognitive
and affective) with others is largely a function of the health and
stability of the intrapsychic self structure.

But more importantly,

one always has the sense with Kohut that it is the whole self, the
being whose unique reality is the prior ground within which and out
of which the endopsychic structure takes form that is the focus of
concern.

It is the whole self's capacity to experience the joy of

its own aliveness and well-being and the satisfaction of striving and
thriving towards the realizations of its own inner directed goals
that are the marks of a healthy and vigorous self.
When Kegan referred to the self, he appeared to be simply desig
nating that experiencing organism (without implications of complex
mental states or the presumed structure in which these occur) which,
in the process of differentiating from its life-surround, can and
does actively participate in this differentiation (making meaning out
of it) and affectively respond to this process in an ontological
awareness--the experience of a self in a relative state of equilib
rium (having organized and made meaning of its current self-other
relationship), or the experience of disequilibrium (the awareness of
change, of shifting ground) in the ongoing sense of self.

In short,
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for Kegan the self appears to be the conscious, experiencing agency
of the organism, an agency whose capacities mature through ever more
complex cognitive levels of self-other configurations.
Selfobject and Culture of Embeddedness
Regardless of whether or not the self is ultimately conceived of
as a separate entity, it should be clear from much of the previous
analysis, that both Kohut and Kegan placed primary emphasis on the
self-in-relation rather than the self in isolation.

A brief descrip

tion of the functions of the 11 other 11 in the development of the self
was given above, but a careful examination is needed of the precise
qualities of the 1 other,
1

1

1

both when the other is viewed as the exter

nal, interpersonal environment of the self, and when it is viewed
psychologically, from the inside of the self.

It is the psychologi

cal value and meaning of the 1other 11 that will be the primary focus
1

of this discussion.
Kohut
Kohut called the 11 other 11 or object, in so far as it relates to
and promotes the psychological growth of the self, the selfobject.
In his earlier work he hyphenated the term, but the later form in
which the two words are combined will be used here.

Kohut (1984)

distinguished between the general and the specific use of the term
selfobject.

The general meaning is 1 that dimension of our experience
1

of another person that relates to this person's functions in shoring
up our self 11 (p. 50).

This refers to a unique aspect of the
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ordinary, mature relationships of the self with others in which the
response of the other or the meaning and value of the other is such
that the self receives enhancement from that experience.

Kohut

(1984) wrote of the self-other relationship in its selfobject func
tion as being sectoral or layered rather than segmental.

In other

words, when the adult self experiences certain types of self enhance
ment, for example, feeling an uplifting surge in admiration of a
great ideal,

1

1

the selfobject experiences of all the previous stages

of life reverberate unconsciously 11 (p. 50).

The specific meaning of

selfobject, as opposed to the general meaning just given, refers to
the early infancy development of the selfobject as integral to the
psychological reality of the infant.

Kohut called this the archaic

selfobject, and the difference is that the archaic selfobject is
experienced as part of the self.

In this archaic form the selfobject

is the precursor of psychic structure and, in fact, often functions
for and as the psychological equipment of the infant.

In early in

fancy there are many times in which the merger is nearly total, the
selfobject being experienced as an extension of the self with the
expected control over the other that one would have over his or her
own mind or body.

In the treatment of narcissistic personality dis

orders (or any condition related to the lack of completion of basic
self formation), these archaic forms of creating and relating to the
other are revived in special types of transferences.
It should go without saying that the archaic selfobject is not a
true object wanted or desired on the basis of its own separate quali
ties.

Rather, it is needed for the function it provides in the
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maintenance of the primitive self.

Without empathic mirroring the

primitive self would not experience the joy of its own well-being-
its grandiose (narcissistic) pleasure.

The self experiences this

suffusion of joy and energy by merging with the experience of the
empathic mirrorer as the selfobject empathically and accurately re
flects back and reverberates with the experience of the self.

Like

wise, by merging with the idealized other in moments of distress or
need, the self again experiences an archaic sense of its own omnipo
tence by participating in the calm, strong, all-sufficient capacity
of the idealized caregiver providing for its needs.

The absence or

serious inadequacy of such selfobject merger experiences severely
retards the capacity of the self to develop some independent capacity
to perform these self-expressive and self-soothing functions.

The

selfobject is the source that provides the confirmation of the self 1 s
own emerging capacities.

Without appropriate merger and the subse

quent, complex process of separating from the merger in supportive
contexts, the self cannot become a viable entity.
With the psychological maturation process, the functions that
were performed for the self by the selfobject as its externalized
psyche are internalized, resulting in the endopsychic structure of
the self.

Selfobjects are needed now no less than before, but the

way they are needed begins to shift significantly.

In some respects,

and at some times, they still function for the self, especially at
times of stress and anxiety.

In other respects their function begins

to be experienced as coming from a separate other in a supportive,
interactive relationship.

The archaic merger features of early
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infancy slowly give way to a more differentiated relationship in
which the self recognizes that the source of support is external.
There now is a self that is cohesive enough to work at sustaining
itself by turning to others in a deliberate and conscious way for
selfobject needs.

During moments of affective intensity or stress

the self restores its cohesion by temporary merger with the self
object aspect of the caretaker, whether through evoking mirroring or
identifying with the idealized power of the other.

In addition the

cohesive self has the capacity to turn to others as true objects in
the classic sense of instinctual object cathexis.

The early cathexis

was a narcissistic cathexis only in the sense that the cathexis was
with an 11 object 11 that the self experienced as itself.

It is not the

same as the classical notion of narcissism in which libido is with
drawn from an object and invested in a separately experienced ego or
self.

In the language of the myth of Narcissus it would be a type of

narcissism without Narcissus, at least without Narcissus experiencing
himself as an object of attention.
In healthy development a firmly consolidated self would be
achieved in the pre-Oedipal years, allowing for the strength to
handle the somewhat more stressful and more large scale internaliza
tions that occur during the Oedipal phase.

During the Oedipal phase

there occurs a shift from the predominantly narcissistic cathexis of
the selfobject to a cathexis of the object as a separately experi
enced other desired for its own characteristics and capacities to
satisfy the wishes of the self.

The important difference between

self psychology and classical theory must be reiterated here.

For
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self psychology development is not a "replacement of selfobjects by
object love, not as a move from narcissism to object love" (Kohut ,
1984, p. 52).

It is a matter of archaic narcissism (healthy infan

tile grandiosity) being transformed into mature narcissism (produc
tive and creative self expression) with the ongoing, nurturing feed
back from mature selfobjects.

Parallel to this development is the

healthy self's true object (object as a separately recognized other
or center of initiative) relations, in which objects are both ca
thected as separate realities and related to as separate realities,
as in classical theory.

The absence or inadequacy of the real ob

ject, or rejection by the object of the self has distinctly different
detrimental effects on the self from the effects produced by poor
selfobject functioning.

Poor selfobject functioning diminishes the·

cohesion and vigor of the whole self; poor object functioning (given
a reasonably vigorous and healthy self) results in the kinds of symp
toms associated with neurosis, the distress of an ego attempting to
resolve inner conflict.
Thus, in self psychology the more mature functioning of the
selfobject (as opposed to its archaic function) is still and always
distinguished from that of the instinct-satisfying function of the
object of traditional theory.

Kohut (1984) said that "the healthy

self always needs the sustaining responses of selfobjects from the
first to last breath" (p. 49).

The mature selfobject is not just a

source of nourishment which the otherwise independent self draws on;
neither is the object a necessary inconvenience by which the self
gets its instincts satisfied; rather the self-selfobject relationship
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is always one of essential interdependence.

The mature sophisticated

performer needs the response of the audience as the audience needs
the performer, each being nourished through a projection of aspects
of the self onto the other.

The parent and child need each other and

they both need the family--the self cannot be experienced as a self
apart from these relations.

The advanced scholar needs ideals and

heroes as much as the schoolchild needs them as inspirations and
goals around which to focus and shape the ambitions of the self.

A

mature adult has built an elaborate support system for his or her
self, much of which is internalized and self-generated, but much of
which is still dependent on the ongoing complex interactions of the
self and others.

But without the unique supporting nourishment of

confirmation (mirroring) and the drawing of inspiration from ideals,
even the healthy, strong self would begin to deteriorate, as is evi
denced in the extreme circumstances of prisoners of war or people
suddenly placed in a totally foreign environment.
In sunmary, for Kohut the "other" (studied and explained pri
marily in its intrapsychic rather than its interpersonal manifesta
tion), fulfills two different but complementary functions in its
relationship with the self.

The first is the selfobject function and

the second is the standard object function of traditional theory.
Kohut (1984) said:
It is fruitful to look upon the "I 1 s" experience of
the "You" within two separate frames of reference: (1)
with regard to the role the "You" plays in supporting the
cohesion, strength, and harmony of the self, that is, to
the experience of the "You" as "selfobject"; and (2) with
regard to the "You" (a) as the target of our desire and
love and (b) as the target of our anger and aggression when
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it blocks the way to the object we desire and love, i.e.,
to the experience of the "You" as "object." (p. 52)
Kegan
Kegan's (1982) notion of a "culture of embeddedness" in which
part of the self is always submerged and out of which the self will
evolve and differentiate from in its next evolutionary move is a
concept as rich as Kohut's "selfobject."

In many ways these two

concepts are similar or at least they may be ways of describing the
same psychological phenomena--the way in which the self and other are
always partially merged, the ways that the "other" component of the
dyadic unit supports and contributes to the growth of the self, and
the way that the differentiation and reintegration process takes
place.
Kegan's "other," more so than Kohut's, is considered from both
an intrapsychic and a psychosocial viewpoint.

Intrapsychic here is

used to refer to the inner experience or meaning of a given self
other interaction or stage of relationship, not to intrapsychic
structure or functioning. As for Kohut the infant's self experience
is virtually merged with that of the selfobject, so for Kegan the
infant's experience is confused and mingled with its human environ
ment.

Making the point that this culture of embeddedness is both

real and psychological, Kegan (1982) wrote, "The infant, I have said,
is embedded in its sensing and moving, but there is a real human
environment in which it lives, with which it confuses its own sensing
and moving" (p. 115). The caretaker "provides the very context in
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which development takes place, and from the point of view of the
newborn she is part of the self.
context

She provides a true psychosocial

. and the transformation by which she becomes for the

infant gradually less 'psycho' and more 'social' describes the very
evolution of meaning itself" (p. 115).
Kegan took Winnicott's idea of a "holding environment," the
psychosocial context necessary for the survival of the infant, and
extends it to all levels of development, each "holding environment"
being different in quality and content from the previous one but
essentially similar in the nature of the function it provides--to so
harmoniously correspond in its confirming and culturing function to
the unique and current state or stage of the self.

When the holding

environment is doing its job well, the self may not even notice that
it is there but simply takes for granted that its supportive environ
ment is there.

At any stage (except for the incorporative) there is

for the merging self some aspects of the real, social "other," but
there is also a significant portion of the self (psychologically
speaking) embedded in and undifferentiated from its environment.
Kegan said, "Since this is the very context in which, and out of
which, the person grows, I have come to think of it as a culture of
embeddedness

11

(

p. 116).

The specific function of the culture of embeddedness, much like
the function of the selfobject aspect of the other, is a psychologi
cal function rather than a "real" function of feeding, holding, and
praising.

It is to support in the sense of incubating, so to speak,

those emerging aspects of the self that are still experienced, in

88
their intimate interactions with the other, only subjectively, as
automatic, unexamined qualities of the self still partially fused or
embedded in the other, not as objective, conscious qualities of the
self over which it has some control.

Just as for Kohut when the

mirroring other empathically responds to a child's experience, the
child participates, emotionally and psychologically, in the more
mature psychic organization of the selfobject, thus enhancing the
inner, self experience of the child, so for Kegan the function of the
culture of embeddedness is to hold and confirm the inner experience
(the way the child is making meaning or experiencing) by gofng along
with the movement and flow of the child.

For example, in the incor

porative era the psychologies of the infant are reflexes, sensing,
and moving.

The attuned caretaker responds with holding (emotional

and physical) that is in delicate harmony with the sensations felt
and the moves initiated by the infant.
After some basic differentiation has been attained, some sense
that there is a difference between the moving of the self and the
moving of the other, the child achieves some sense of control over
his or her moves and differentiation of his or her own moves from
those of the caretaker.

However, the child is now embedded in his or

her impulses and perceptions.

At this stage, the other, although

differentiated at a primary level (that there is another), is not
differentiated from the current embeddedness--the perceptions and
impulses.

Therefore, the healthy mother and family intuitively re

spond to the toddler's way of perceiving them (without correcting the
egocentric perception) and to the toddler's impulses (when
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appropriate) by honoring the impulse, perhaps in extending the ex
cited movement of the child or doing its bidding as though the
child's wish were its conmand.

This has the same psychological fla

vor as Kohut's suggestion that the selfobject is experienced as an
extension of the body and mind of the self and with the same sense of
expected control over them.
Sunmary
It seems justifiable to say, then, that for both Kegan and Kohut
psychological development, while it can to some extent be described
as a series of changing patterns in external relationships between
two separate beings, a self and an other (or many others), is much
more about the changing nature and role of the other with respect to
its inner, psychological function and meaning at any given stage.
The primary focus of both their theories is on the inner role that
the "other" plays (even though its performance takes place and is
observable in the external world of interactions) in sustaining the
currently composed self and in stimulating the growth of the emerging
self, the side of the self struggling to emerge from embeddedness
(Kegan) and the self attempting to imitate and then internalize the
function that had been modeled by and idealized in the selfobject
(Kohut).
The use of the term "role" here is obviously doing double duty.
Empirically one could observe the action of the mother performing her
"role" vis-a-vis the child.

From the inside of the child, that role

is much more complex, for at any given moment, there is (after
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earliest infancy) the child's experience of an external person inter
acting with it and, also, at various levels and qualities, an inter
mingling and confusion of, and an experience of an echo and extension
of, itself in the other; not just an actor on its stage, but one
intimately connected to its sense of self such that there is the
unexamined expectation that the other is there to express and meet
the impulses, wishes, and needs of the self.
The difference in their theories with regard to the successive
changes of the self-other relationship is that Kegan attempted to
name both the inner qualities and capacities (the 1 1 psychologics 11 )
which constitute the subjective portion of the self at any given
stage (for example, reflexes, impulses, enduring disposition or
needs) and then to name the corresponding external real 11 world as
11

pects of the environment that are needed to culture the inner and
emerging qualities at each level of emergence.

Kohut does not at

tempt to delineate a succession of increasingly differentiated and
sophisticated cognitive conceptions of the self-other experience, nor
does he attempt to name and describe a series of uniquely constituted
environments needed to correspond with each level of development.
Wolf (1980) stated that one of the current challenges for self psy
chology is to develop a more detailed view of the line of selfobject
development.

It is one of the objectives of this study to examine

whether Kegan's more detailed psychosocial developmental framework
might be usefully related to an elaboration of self psychology's
basic framework.
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The strength of self psychology may lie in the paradox of its
simplicity vis-a-vis its depth and richness with respect to naming,
conceptualizing, and describing the subtle functioning of two univer
sal modes of self and other relating.

At first reading the discover

ies of Kohut can appear to be too obvious to be worthy of new atten
tion, as breakthroughs in conceptualizations often appear to be.

As

one begins to appreciate the power of his conceptualizations to ex
plain the subtle processes involved in the development of the self,
and the multifaceted aspects of selfobject functioning, what once
seemed simple and obvious becomes considerably more complex.

It is

another objective of this study to examine how Kohut's selfobject
concept might enrich the notion that Kegan has of the self's meaning
with respect to any given self and other configuration.
The Subject to Object Shift and
Transmuting Internalization
At the core of any developmental theory, regardless of how the
theory might end up characterizing the various stages of development,
is its conceptualization of the process of psychological growth.
Ways to examine a conceptualization of the process of psychological
growth are helped by questions such as the following:
or spurs growth?

What motivates

What is it that actually changes in the psychologi

cal make-up of the self when growth occurs and how does this change
occur?

What is meant by internalization?

roles of the self and other in the process?

What are the respective
What role do cognition,

perception, and affect play in change and growth?
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Kegan
Every aspect of Kegan's formulation of the process of psycholog
ical growth is born out of the basic Piagetian image of growth as
evolutionary emergence from a state of lesser to a state of greater
differentiation.

This underlying framework operates through a re

peated back and forth motion or dialogue between the self and the
other.

Each new stage begins with a struggle by which some aspect of

the self differentiates itself from that with which it was formerly
embedded, and ends, after reorganizing the construction of the self,
by reintegrating (relating to as a separate object) the aspect of the
other that was formerly experienced as part of the self.

This is the

subject to object shift, and it is a complex operation requiring some
explanation.
The subject-object balance is the deep structure in meaning
evolution, and growth involves a restructuring of a given balance.
Kegan (1982) said, "Growth always involves a process of differentia
tion, or emergence from embeddedness (Schactel, 1959), thus creating
out of the former subject a new object to be taken by the new subjec
tivity'' (p. 31).

Viewed from an observer position this description

seems fairly simple and obvious--an organism (a self) at one level of
connection or merger with its environment makes a distinct step out
ward, emerges to a new stage, and thereby becomes more distinct and
less embedded.

When experienced from within the emerging self, how

ever, it is an entirely different story.

From the inside what was

formerly a whole way of being, a way of experiencing oneself and
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one's relationship to the outside, begins to give way.

One's whole

� of knowing, not just what was known and taken for granted to be
so about the outside world and the self, but the very way the self
was organized to know, the perspective or glasses through which all
experience was perceived, now gives way; it seems to no longer hold,
and it is experienced as inadequate to meet the needs of new experi
ence.

After a time of confusion and transition, a new and wider

perspective begins to come together which involves a significant
reorganization of both the self and the other.

Thus both the self

and the 11 world 11 are completely recreated in this shift.

Not only is

there a new self and world to be known but a fundamentally new
quality to the way of knowing.

This is what Kegan meant when he

referred to psychological growth as the evolution of meaning-consti
tutive activity.
One of the best methods to understand this concept is to think
in tenns of Kuhn's (1962) notion of what really happens in a given
science when a new paradigm supercedes an old one--how everything
that was 11 known 11 before (all the facts, so to speak) are given a new
and wider frame of reference; they are remade and newly understood in
a new contextual framework, and the knower understands himself or
herself differently in respect to the known.

Kegan used the geo

graphical comparison of Columbus discovering the New World, a discov
ery that was not just a new addition to an old framework but one that
required a new understanding of the entire known world.
Kegan (1982) described a beautiful film taken over a period of
months that tries to capture the nature of psychological "hatching"
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by showing the subtle changes in an infant's relationship with an
object (in this case a necklace and a ball}:
It is difficult, for anyone, unless forewarned, to resist
the perception that the little necklace or the rubber ball
is remaining the same throughout the film while only the
infant is changing; that the two-year drama contains two
characters--an infant and an object--whose entivity remains
the same. The film takes on a whole new life if one sees
that a single dynamic organism, 11 baby-and-ball, 11 is gradu
ally undergoing a process of transformation. Over a period
roughly from nine to twenty-one months, the baby-and-ball
begins to be something other than a single entity, but does
not quite constitute, as yet, two distinct entities. Al
though the hidden object is not immediately given up, its
pursuit is easily defeated. One has the sense of a differ
entiation so fragile, so tentative, that it can very easily
merge back into oneness. . . . In the early months the
child gives it up without protest of any kind. He does
not, it seems clear, have it, in the sense of its being
something apart from, something to be bound up with. As he
gets older it seems that it is not only his physical grasp
that intensifies and articulates (from gross to fine motor
coordination, for example), but a psychological one as
well. All in all, the film, then, is capturing a motion,
the motion of "throwing from, 11 of differentiation, which
creates the object, and the motion of integration, which
creates the object relation. (pp. 80-81)
This is Kegan's description of the first reconstruction of the self
and other--the creation of the permanence of the object and the new
relationship to the object (which also entails a new sense of the
self).

All subsequent subject-object shifts are higher level trans

formations of the same basic process.
It might be asked at this point how such a view of psychological
growth--the increasing emergence of a distinct and separate self and
the increasing creation of and experiencing of a separate and more
distinct outside world--uses the concept of internalization, a con
cept that is central to the psychoanalytic understanding of growth.
In this theory internalization does not just happen by virtue of the

95
self taking in and making mental representation of that which happens
to be outside the self.

Rather, internalization is intricately a

part of the process of differentiation, the process of the subject to
object shift.

Kegan (1982) noted that it "seems counterintuitive to

describe internalization as a process by which something becomes less
subjective, or moves from subject to object" (p. 31), but it is only
after the self has differentiated itself from the ball, the mother,
or some aspect of the mother, that it can then hold that object or
experience of the object, as a separate reality in its mind.

The

same is true not only of external objects but also of the experiences
of the self--psychological qualities and capacities like reflexes or
sensations, and later on perceptions, and still later such qualities
as self conceptualizations and stable dispositions.
These internal qualities, as long as they are wholly subjective,
are not really part of the internalized structure that the self can
deliberately work with until after the self has "made them object"
and then taken them into the mind as distinct elements of the self.
Thus Kegan spoke of having these qualities as part of the self rather
than being them, as is the case before differentiating from them.

In

having them, as in the child eventually having the ball described
above, what was 1 subject 11 or psychologically "fused with" becomes
1

object or separate, allowing for its internalization, its being held
in the mind.
An interesting image that Kegan used to convey his notion of
internalization is that of a species evolution from exoskeletal to
endoskeletal.

Psychologically it is a shift from a state in which
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the child could only experience something while in inmediate and
direct contact with some external or physical part of reality to a
state in which that experience or object is given a stable, ongoing
place in the child's internal reality; and consequently, the child
can have a new relationship to the object and, with regard to emerg
ing psychological capacities, some degree of conscious control over
them.
With regard to what motivates or spurs psychological growth in
Kegan's theory, it is again very helpful to think in terms of Kuhn's
(1962} explanation of what produces a paradigm shift in given disci
pline or field of inquiry.

When increasing "anomalies" appear on the

scene that cannot be understood in the old frame of reference, and
when one or more of these anomalies is of sufficient weight and na
ture that it forces a direct questioning of the underlying premises
of the old paradigm, there is great stress and great pressure to find
a new way of thinking, a new way of organizing the material, so that
once again things "make sense.

11

It was noted above that growth from

one psychological era to the next entails what amounts to a loss of
the old self, a loss of the old way of cohering, and of knowing, and
essentially of being.

At such a time the self is powerfully moti

vated, according to Kegan (1982), by a 11 transorganic motive shared by
all living things" which can be described as the need to restore "the
greater coherence of its organization" or, more cognitively speaking,
"to make meaning or resolve discrepancy; but this would not be dif
ferent than to say it is moved to preserve and enhance its integrity"
(p. 84).
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The pressures for a major reorganization come both from within
the organism (as maturational growth in mental and physical capaci
ties occurs and seeks expression) and from the environment (as less
mature behavior is given less support over time and new behaviors and
attitudes are encouraged).

Thus, the child experiences that the old

way of doing things does not seem to be working as well as it once
did, and although it is painful and sometimes deeply resisted, a new
way of seeing things is eventually not only accepted, but also de
manded.
Kohut
For Kohut the process of psychological growth, which he called
"transmuting internalization," is motivated by similar needs--the
need of the self to maintain a sense of coherence and of the self 1 s
well-being and mastery in the face of threats and frustrations.
Ultimately the motivations of the self and the subsequent specific
formations of selfobject relationships are based on the self 1 s effort
to maintain a sense of well-being and wholeness (integrity) that was
originally experienced in a state of perfection (thus the attempt to
restore perfection through the grandiosity of the self or the ideali
zation of the parent).
With Kegan the conditions for growth are brought on by discrep
ancies and inadequacies of the given structure to accommodate new
material; with Kohut it is the frustration experienced by the self in
interaction with selfobjects that goads the self to growth.

In this

case it is some small aspect or function (not the whole) of the
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selfobject that is internalized.

It might be a self-soothing sound

or statement, or a problem-solving act, that was formerly experienced
in a sense of partial merger with the power of the selfobject, which,
under conditions of "optimal frustration," the self begins to recog
nize as a capacity it can perform for itself.

This is similar to

Kegan's notion of eventually having a capacity rather than being it.
Kohut's conceptualization is clearly more psychoanalytic than
Kegan's, but there is the basic similarity that psychological growth
occurs by virtue of a separating out or differentiation process and
then an internalization of new material--a mental representation or a
mental awareness of a psychological experience, for example, the
experience of an impulse.

This new material is taken into the mind

or self in such a way that this new material is now more usable,
11

11

more under the conscious control and awareness of the self, more
objective by virtue of its being made an object of mental attention
and then held (internalized) in the mind.
Kohut (1977) said that the basic process of building self struc
ture takes place by "bringing about the separation of the psychologi
cal structures that ultimately form the self from those that will be
excluded" (p. 174).

This process takes place in the matrix of self

object interactions in which alternating experiences of merger with
and separation from the selfobject abet the separation and growth
process, just as for Kegan the self emerges from a merged embedded
ness with its environment. As for Kegan, the process is triggered by
arising anomalies or discrepancies that overtax the old system.
Kohut referred to such experiences as "optimal frustrations."

They
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are the necessary and inevitable nontraumatic disturbances in the
flow of things that stimulate the self to participate in its own
growth by stretching its psychological muscles, so to speak.
Kohut (1977) suggested that the child 11 expects 11 an empathic
environment to be in tune with its needs and wishes just as its lungs
11

expect 11 an environment which contains oxygen.

On thousands of occa

sions microinternalizations occur when, after minor disturbances of
the child's psychological balance, the child's tensions are empathi
cally perceived and responded to be the selfobject.

He described the

process:
The self-object then establishes tactile and/or vocal con
tact with the child (the mother picks up the child, talks
to it while holding and carrying it) and thus creates con
ditions that the child phase-appropriately experiences as a
merger with the omnipotent self-object. . . . The relevant
feeling states--either the child's own or those of the
self-object in which he participates--, in the order in
which they are experienced by the self/self-object unit
are: mounting anxiety (self); followed by stabilized mild
anxiety--a 11 signal 11 not panic--(self-object); followed by
calmness, absence of anxiety (self-object). . . . It is the
experience of this sequence of psychological events via the
merger with the empathic omnipotent self-object that sets
up the base line from which optimum (nontraumatic, phase
appropriate) failures of the self-object lead, under normal
circumstances, to structure building via transmuting inter
nalization. (pp. 86-87)
It is under such conditions that the self internalizes aspects and
functions of the selfobject that the self formerly experienced as
part of itself thereby laying down structure that forms the nuclear
self.

It should be emphasized that Kohut insisted that the first

step, the empathic selfobject's attunement to and inclusion of the
child into its own psychological organization, is more important than
the second step, remedying the problem through action, at least with
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respect to fostering the child's ability to build psychological
structure.
In a more experience-distant and abstract formulation of growth
Kohut (1971) described three factors involved in transmuting inter
nalization. The first involves a psychic readiness for specific
formation, a "maturationally preformed receptivity for specific in
trojects 11 (p. 49).

The second, more complicated concept involves the

breaking up or fractionalization of the aspects of the "object imago"
that are being internalized. This relates to the nontraumatic, opti
mal doses that are needed. Kohut stated:
Expressed concretely, the withdrawal of narcissistic ca
thexis takes place in a fractionated way if the child can
experience disappointments with one idealized aspect or
quality of the object after another; transmuting internali
zation is prevented, however, if, for example, the dis
appointment in the perfection of the object concerns the
total object, e.g., when the child suddenly recognizes that
the omnipotent object is powerless. (p. 50)
The third factor involved in building self structure is related
to the second. The breaking up of the total imago into smaller as
pects that are internalized bit by bit allows for the depersonaliza
tion of the introjected aspects of the idealized image of the object.
"The internal structure, in other words, now performs the functions
which the object used to perform for the child--the well-functioning
structure, however, has largely been divested of the personality
features of the object" (Kohut, 1971, p. 50)
For Kohut, then, psychological growth always takes place in a
matrix of interaction between the self and the environment (usually a
selfobject) in which a disruption in the perfection experience of the
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unity of the self and selfobject results in awareness of separate
ness.

This awareness evokes anxiety, which if appropriately re

sponded to by the selfobject, restores the sense of well-being, and
in the process of repairing the rift between the self and selfobject,
the self is challenged to expand its own resources and thus experi
ences a small increment in its capacity to care for itself.

As with

Kegan's view, if this restoration and reintegration of the self
selfobject relationship does not occur, the process of growth is
experienced psychologically as a traumatic loss of both the self and
the selfobject as they were constituted.
Sunmary
Although there are many similarities between Kohut's and Kegan's
view of growth, there are significant differences.

One difference is

that Kohut sees most growth taking place in tiny increments whose
accumulated result is largely seen in a stronger, more coherent, and
stabler self.

Growth is conceptualized more in enrichment and elabo

ration of a basic self structure than in wholesale reconstructions of
the self, although more massive changes do take place at nodal points
such as the Oedipal phase.

Kohut's view of growth clearly emphasizes

its affective factors, both as motivators and as evidences of growth
(improved sense of well-being and self-esteem manifested in creative
and vigorous self-expression).
Kegan's view of growth is clearly described in more cognitive
language and conception than is Kohut's.

He sees growth as mani

fested in new and more elaborate ways of looking at and experiencing
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the world.

A greater difference lies in the fact that Kegan formu

lates change not so much in terms of minute increments as in substan
tial reconstructions of the way the self and other are constituted.
He included affect in the process in terms of motivation, that is,
frustration and anxiety in the face of discrepancies evokes the need
to make sense out of things, but the positive motivation to change,
the need to "make meaning," while having an affective component, has
a more cognitive flavor than Kohut 1 s notion of the motivation to re
store a sense of well-being in a relationship.

CHAPTER IV
INTEGRATION
A Common Premise
Part of the rationale for this study is based on the assumption
that if it can be successfully argued that two theorists who relied
on different data bases could eventually develop similar theoretical
explanations for a broad range of psychological and behavioral phe
nomena around human development, then those conceptualizations gain
merit and theoretical strength in at least two ways.

First, those

theoretical constructions can be said to have a broader and more
substantial foundation in diverse primary data, supported as they are
by two different data bases from related disciplines--intrapsychic
data and psychosocial (behavioral) data.

And second, those theoreti

cal constructions, reinforcing each other, would merit increased
attention from practitioners and researchers with respect to testing
out various applications of the constructs as well as the validity of
the implications of the theories.
The two theories in this study are derived from different data
bases--Kohut's from data observed in a clinical setting through the
special instrumentation of vicarious introspection (empathy), and
Kegan's from a mixture of empirical research findings and observa
tions of behavior in clinical and natural settings.

Nevertheless it

is the general contention of this study that Kegan and Kohut have
103
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identified a wide range of psychological phenomena that are essen
tially the same phenomena seen from a slightly different point of
view.

Secondly, their explanations for these phenomena, while dif

ferent in terminology and conceptualization, can often be shown to be
compatible and supportive of one another.

In other words, they may

be starting from different observational stances and using different
primary data as building blocks for their theories, but some of their
basic premises and many of the conclusions that they reach and the
constructs they employ to explain psychological development can be
demonstrated to be complementary and harmonious.
This study suggests that there is a common underlying premise
about the nature of the self that can be used as a framework for
integrating the two theories.

Although there are differences in

their respective philosophical views of the self, as discussed in
Chapters II and III, and also differences in their conceptualizations
of the psychological characteristics of the self, they appear to have
identified a common basic characteristic of the self that underlies
all of their higher level concepts and constructs.
This underlying premise is that the self, in all its dealings
with and configurational connections with others, is motivated by two
innate psychological needs or strivings (regardless of how these
needs may be based on or related to physiological needs or drives).
For both Kegan and Kohut these two sets of needs are not just two
separate and distinct sets of needs; rather the two are dynamic parts
of an underlying unity.

They appear opposed when defined in terms of

their behavioral manifestations and the type and nature of the
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psychological needs they fulfill, but they are better understood as
partners in harness in the sense that each is needed for the develop
ment and integrity of the whole self.

Just as magnetic poles require

each other to create a unified magnetic field, each of the poles of
the self is essential to the dynamic energy flow of the whole self.
It is, in fact, the creative tension between these opposites that
seems to produce the energy for growth and to give that energy shape
and direction with respect to the specific type, quality, and con
tents of a given self and other configuration.
Kegan described these polarities in terms of two profound human
"yearnings"--the yearning to be included, part of, joined with, and
held, versus the yearning to be autonomous, separate, distinct, and
independent.

It was suggested in Chapter II that Kegan's view of the

internal psychologies of inclusion versus independence are reflected
in external forms of interpersonal relationships, and that this view
of the internal psychologies of the self offers a bridge between
Kegan's essentially psychosocial psychology and an intrapsychic view
of psychology.

Speaking of the internal dynamics of these poles and

their essential unity, Kegan (1982) said:
But what is most striking about these two great human
yearnings is that they seem to be in conflict, and it is,
in fact, their relation--this tension--that is of more
interest to me at the moment than either yearning by it
self. I believe it is a lifelong tension. Our experience
of the unitary, restless, creative motion of life itself.
(p. 107)
For Kohut it is not just that there are two dynamically related
strivings in the self, but he postulates a distinct intrapsychic self
structure from which each striving arises.

The similarity in their
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views of the dynamic relation between the two poles as well as the
underlying unity is especially demonstrated by Wolf (1980):
Tension between divergent constituent trends of the self
becomes an integral part of the organization of the self
from the very beginning. Kohut (1977) has discussed the
bipolar nature of the self in great detail. The tension
arc from the pole which harbors the nuclear ambitions to
the pole which is the carrier of the nuclear ideals makes
internal contradiction and tension part of the very consti
tution of the self. . . . The bipolar organization of the
self may well be an expression of the fundamental dialectic
of all life precariously balanced between the entropic
direction of matter and the negentropic direction inherent
in biological organizations. Thus the self is also forever
precariously balanced between the entropic yearning for
union (or merger) on the one hand, and the negentropic
striving for differentiation, separateness, and boundaries
on the other. (p. 126f)
What this study proposes is that Kohut and Kegan have each ar
rived at (one could even say discovered) a common underlying psycho
logical phenomenon--the whole self expressed through and constituted
by a dynamic polarity that has distinct inner (psychological) charac
teristics and observable external manifestations (interpersonal be
havior).

Kohut's emphasis has been on the intrapsychic characteris

tics, but he also has dealt with the "real life" manifestations in
therapeutic and normal relationships.

Kegan's emphasis has been on

the interpersonal characteristics, but he has dealt very much with
the psychological characteristics as well.

Kegan insisted that his

theory is both cognitive and affective, but it is the view of this
writer that Kegan's is primarily a cognitive psychology with affect
being understood in terms of and in response to cognitive structure
and its changes.

Nevertheless, affect is clearly seen as intrinsic

to the whole process, not an added dimension.

Kohut's psychology,
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being psychoanalytic, couches most of the central issues of the
self 1 s development in terms of affective tensions and needs.

It is

suggested here that if the two theories can be bridged, the old prob
lem of affect versus cognition may be better understood.
The broad lines of the proposed integration will be built around
Kegan•s model of the helix.

Using this framework it will be demon

strated how Kohut 1 s bipolar self concept might be viewed as an inte
gral part of the helix, with special emphasis throughout on how the
underlying dual dynamics of each theory contribute to this integra
tion.

After the basic model has been modified to accommodate the

contributions of each theory, an effort will be made to demonstrate
how many of the higher order but less basic concepts and terms of
each theorist can be seen to reflect each other.

It should be noted

that there will be no exact 11 term for term 11 correspondence, for that
would not do justice to the different frameworks that produced the
concepts or to the nuances of each theorist 1 s terms and concepts.
The Basic Framework
The basic thrust of this proposed integration is that a correla
tion can be drawn between Kegan 1 s 11 psychologics of inclusion11 and
Kohut•s 11 idealized parent imago 11 on the one side of the dual
structured model, and between Kegan 1 s 11 psychologics of autonomy 11 and
Kohut•s 11 grandiose self 11 on the other side of the model.

It is not

contended that these constructs are synonymous but that they are
highly compatible formulations of the same phenomena, each emphasiz
ing different aspects of the whole picture.

It should be remembered
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that each of these poles of the self is never conceptualized as a
part of an isolated psychological entity called the self but is in
trinsically defined in relation to its current configurational con
nection with others, whether as internalized objects or actual sig
nificant others.

Therefore, in each case it will be shown not only

how a given pole of the self (as though it were an isolated entity)
is similar in Kegan and Kohut, but how the correlated relationship of
that pole of the self to its environment bears many similarities in
the different approaches.
The constituent of the self that has a powerful need or pull for
autonomy in Kegan can be compared to the constituent of the self that
seeks its own unique expression and aggrandizement in Kohut--the
autonomous self parallels the grandiose self.

In both cases they

seem to be acknowledging a basic and primary aspect of the self and a
basic need of the self that requires reasonable expression and ful
fillment for normal and healthy development.

This pole of the self

strives for uniqueness, separate identity, and its own grand self
expression under the sometimes intense impetus of not being influ
enced by the wishes or input from others.

Its very meaning is that

it emerges from the unique potential of this particular self, and it
will insure that this need gets some fulfillment even at great cost
to what appears to be its outside 11 relationships.
11

From an inter

personal or psychosocial perspective some manifestations of this need
would appear to be selfish, egocentric, and negative with respect to
others in the environment.

Intrapsychic perspectives usually explain

this phenomenon in terms of narcissism.

This idea bears some
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resemblance to the traditional psychoanalytic notion of the pleasure
principle in which the Id seeks unbridled expression.

However, for

both Kegan and Kohut the purpose and meaning of this aspect of the
self is very different from a drive for libidinal satisfaction.

The

purpose of this aspect of development is to strengthen the self (that
which would be referred to as the ego from many perspectives) in
order that the self become a viable psychological reality able to
withstand the many misfortunes and blows of life, to develop its
unique abilities, to relate to others as a differentiated and inde
pendent self, and to sustain its own life project.

Without the de

velopment of this pole of the self, there could be no clear self
identity {distinct from all others), no firm and cohesive self
agency, no capacity for healthy self-esteem, and no relating to oth
ers apart from dependency needs.
The paradox of the development of this grandiose, egocentric,
autonomous side of the self, which can appear to be so sealed up and
even anti-other, is that it requires just as much connection with,
support from, and even psychological merger with, others as the in
clusion pole of the self.

An integration of the ways each theorist

views this pole's connection with others will be given, but first the
similarity in their views of the dependent, inclusive pole of the
self will be presented.
The pole of Kegan's self that is "yearning" for inclusion can be
compared with Kohut s idea 1 i zed parent imago.
I

II

11

It is interesting

that in both cases this constituent of the self is less defined as a
reality in itself and more defined in terms of others.

For Kegan
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this is the yearning of the self to blend with others, to be part of
another or part of a group (like a family or peer group).

This as

pect of the self is by definition very much shaped by others and is
willing to yield some separateness and uniqueness in the process.
Kohut did not give this constituent of the self a name, as he did
with the grandiose self, because this aspect of the self sustains its
reality by projecting itself onto others.

Recall that this pole is

one of two efforts by the self to maintain its sense of power and
perfection when it experiences the initial loss of paradise.

It is

as though part of the self says, "I am no longer perfect and power
ful, but� are and I am part of you.

11

This part of the self is

eventually built up by internalizing aspects of the idealized others
through the appropriate breakdown and reorganization process called
transmuting internalization.
The different theoretical cast of the two theories can be seen
in their emphases and their views of motivation and purpose with
respect to this component of the self.

Kegan sees the motivation in

more cognitive and existential terms.

The self needs to make meaning

out of its ways of being connected; that is, to be part of others is
a way of making sense out of one's experience.

Also, it means some

thing, in the sense that it is desirable and meaningful, to belong to
others.

On a psychosocial level the purpose of this pole of the self

is to develop socialization skills and interpersonal capacities.
For Kohut the motivation driving the development of this pole
has a more affective cast--the maintenance of a sense of power and
perfection which support an underlying sense of well-being.

In
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addition the desire to merge with another has its roots in the legacy
of the sexual or erotic component of psychoanalytic drive theory.
For Kohut the intrapsychic drive and value or purpose of this pole of
the self is to build up the component of the self that can formulate
and work to achieve ideals and goals that are in general harmony with
those of society.

Psychosocially the purpose of this pole is to

internalize the values and ideals of the society in a way that is
uniquely workable and appropriate for this individual, which will
require reforging them in a way that respects as much of the ideal
ized original as possible while also respecting the uniqueness of the
ambitions of the grandiose self (now becoming tamed and modulated
under the influence of the internalized ideals).
The Object-Relational Component of the Poles
Comparing their views on the internal nature and the external
function of the "other" with respect to each pole, reveals a contin
ued similarity.

For Kohut the need for and connection with others by

the grandiose self takes the form of mirroring.

Mirroring is not

simply reflection but a form of echoing and confirming the experience
and reality of the grandiose self in which the mirroring person is
experienced as an extension or amplification of the self, without
drawing attention to its separateness and its own individuality.

Of

course, there is a whole range of qualitatively different forms of
mirroring from archaic to very mature in which the merger experience
is less and less primitive.
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For Kegan the needed relationship with the other by the autono

mous self is described in the confirming function of the culture of
embeddedness.

Kegan described the need of the confirming function on

both sides of the helix, the inclusion side as well as the autono
mous, but the nature of the confirming is different on each side.
will be suggested later that the functions of the selfobject in

It

Kohut's bipolar self-other configurations can enrich Kegan's single

notion of confirming.

The confirming function on the autonomous side

of the helix is to acknowledge and support the self in its highly
independent periods--the imperial and institutional eras. This would
require supporting the self-sufficiency, independence, and competence
building efforts of the imperial school child and the authority,
ambition, and "self-authoring" of the institutional adult.

In both

cases it would require a degree of being willing to be valuable to
the "grandiose" one as a planet in his or her system rather than for
one's real and individual value.

This is what Kegan meant by the

subjectivity of a given self-other balance. The embeddedness is such
that the supporting function of the environment is largely taken for
granted; it is not consciously recognized except when its lack or
absence calls its value to attention.
On the other side of the helix--the inclusive, dependent side
(and Kohut's pole of ideals)--the function of the other is again to
confirm the need for inclusion and to confirm the self in its in
cluded configuration.

Confirming on the inclusion side would mean

acknowledging and participating in the expression of impulses and in
tense attachments in the impulsive era, and acknowledging and
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participating in the mutuality and intersubjectivity of the inter
personal era.
For Kohut the confirming function of the "other" on this side of
the helix would be the allowance of and participation in the merger
experiences of the self with its idealized selfobjects.

As a parent

this would mean being sensitive to the need of a child to idealize
the parent, to welcome and support the child 1 s efforts to imitate the
parent, and to spend time in side by side activities with the child
in which the child participates in the strength and competence of the
idealized parent.

At a more mature level (Kegan 1 s interpersonal

era), it would mean the capacity to handle being idealized in a
mutual relationship (perhaps romantic) in which each party carries
the idealized projections of the other to some extent.
This completes the integration of the basic two-pillar support
ing structure that underlies each theory to the extent that they can
be represented as static conceptualizations of self and other stages
and relationships.

The following section shifts from comparing the

static conceptualizations to an integration of the growth process
itself.
Integrating the Growth Process
Figure 2 represents a modification of Kegan 1 s (1982) helix
(Figure 1) in which symbols of Kohut 1 s bipolar self are superimposed
on the helix.

There is also an effort to depict the possible place

and function of the third pole, the talents and skills.

The symbolic

representation of Kohut 1 s self is represented by circles (the
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grandiose self) connected to triangles (the idealizing pole) via an

electric-like jagged line (the talents and skills).

Note that the

repeated representations of Kohut's self as it develops along the
helix change in several ways.

While both poles are always there and

operating, the idealizing pole is more activated (depicted by the

growing triangle) when the self is moving through what Kegan called

an inclusion era (the impulsive and interpersonal eras).

Likewise,

when Kohut's bipolar self moves through an independence era of Kegan,
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such as the imperial or institutional, the grandiose self (depicted
by the circle) is much larger than at other times.

Finally, the

talents and skills are suggested to be more activated at times of
transition from one era to another, a time when the felt identity and
cohesion of the self, with respect to its self/other configuration is
unstable.

Thus the self clings to and relies upon its identity in

terms of known skills and competencies when other aspects of the self
are changing.

It goes without saying that although these symbols

represent the self at various stages, it is its relationship to the
environment that is being depicted as different at each stage. Thus,
when the grandiose self is constellated, there is a demand on the
environment for mirroring, and likewise when the other poles are
dominant, their respective demands on the environment are being made.
Kegan's basic notion of distinct stages or eras in which the
self (and other) is reorganized or reconstituted is based on his
theory that these reorganizations can be understood as alternating
forms of the "psychologies of inclusion versus the psychologies of
independence." For a period of time, usually several years, the
self/other configuration is settled or balanced in favor of inclusion
and then, after a turbulent transition, is resettled in favor of
autonomy and separateness.

It is suggested here that these "reset

tlements'' are best understood as reorganizations of the underlying
cognitive structure of the self.

It is similar to the way the deep

structure of a paradigm, the unquestioned basic premises, get settled
and then essentially taken for granted as all new information and
experimentation takes place within that framework.

To question the
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basic premises is to threaten the entire system, the way of knowing
and being that had been taken for granted.

This way of knowing is

what Kegan meant by the "new subjectivity" of each new stage.
When the self is settled or organized around the inclusion pole,
the autonomy pole might be said to be recessive, but it is not en
tirely dormant.

In fact, the "pushes" from within and the "pulls"

from the environment that constantly emanate from the opposite pole
are essential contributions to the dynamic struggle of the self to
grow.

And, after some growth within a given self organization, those

pushes and pulls from the opposite pole accumulate enough momentum to
dislodge the old structure and then draw together the contents of the
old structure, after significant transformations, around the new
(autonomy) pole.
The question now is how Kohut's basic conception of a dual dy
namic as the core of the self relates to Kegan's.

It is suggested

here that Kohut's view of the way the bipolar dynamics of the self
work to facilitate psychological growth can add a great deal of depth
and richness to the understanding of the way growth takes place
within a given stage of Kegan's.
Although Kegan does not like to be viewed as a "stage" theorist,
and there is much emphasis on process as well as his existential and
evolutionary motion approach to development that sets him apart from
stage theory, he nevertheless ends up seeing life development in
terms of five basic self/other configurations.

And although he spoke

of the existential meaning and experiential qualities of what it is
like for the self to be in these configurations, it is the underlying
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cognitive and perceptual structure formation of the self that is the
very grammar of his theory.

The point is that he spoke of psycholog

ical development as a complicated interaction of self and environment
which produces five fundamental self/other configurations in predict
able sequence.
Thus, when Kegan spoke of growth, he was talking about major
reorganizations of the self, what produces them and how they take
shape.

The longer periods of life, the times within a given configu

ration, tend to be seen as periods when psychological growth is some
what latent for a while as the status quo is maintained within a
given self/other configuration.
This is not intended as criticism of this view, which after all
seems both intuitively valid and has much support in observational
research.

The point is that Kegan's emphasis is on major self re

organizations rather than on the growth process as minute accumula
tions of self structure through what Kohut called microinternaliza
tions.

Kegan did place great emphasis on the role of the culturing

environment to hold and confirm the self as it is, in any given
stage, and as it becomes, in its transformational struggles.

It is

in this confirming function of the culturing environment, especially
with regard to the strengthening of the self in a given stage, that
Kohut's view might add so much to Kegan's view.
Kohut's emphasis is not on major transformations of the self but
on the microprocesses of growth by which the nuclear seed or poten
tial of the self is nourished.

One could say that Kohut offered a

microscopic view of the tiny pipelines that deliver the nutrients
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necessary to psychological growth.

The basic condition for this

process to work is the empathic attunement of the self and self
object.
The two basic forms that allow the tiny pipelines to connect are
mirroring and idealizing mergers.

The end product of growth is a

more vigorous, coherent self able to realize its innate direction and
potential and, by virtue of its continuous growth in vigor and coher
ence, to more easily weather the turbulence of periods of more large
scale transformations, whether they be conceptualized in terms of
cognitive-perceptual shifts or psychodynamic transformations of in
trapsychic structure resulting from powerful shifts and conflicts in
the realm of self and object cathexis.
Kegan's broad lines of cognitive reorganization and Kohut's
microprocesses can be integrated in the following way.

If one takes

the self as it might be in a given stage of Kegan's, say the inclu
sively organized self of the impulsive era (with the opposite pole of
autonomy some1'/hat recessed and latent), and superimposes the bipolar
self of Kohut onto the given self-other configuration, one could say
that the idealized parent imago (IPI) is highly constellated during
this era.
ration.

Kegan's "self" of this era is a basically stable configu
As he said, the question of what constitutes self and what

constitutes other gets temporarily settled in each stage, and in this
stage it is settled in favor of inclusion.

But what is settled here

is the underlying cognitive and perceptual structure which forms the
subjectivity, the "unconscious" organization of the self through
which it sees and on the basis of which it makes meaning out of
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experience. Kohut's notion of an IPI transference-like relationship
of the self and other can suggest how growth takes place within
Kegan's essentially stable configuration, not by major transforma
tions and reorganizations but by minute internalizations of the self
object--appropriately broken down or fractionalized aspects of the
idealized image.
Thus, as this somewhat "static" self (Kegan) lives for a while
in a given underlying structure, that "self" is strengthened and
grows (Kohut) through microtransformations which strengthen and in
crease this pole of the self. The term transformation is used delib
erately here in conjunction with growth, for although Kohut's notion
of growth is described more in terms of accumulation or adding to
what already exists (the current state of the self) to strengthen it,
it is also eventually transformational in that minute, new pieces of
the self structure are being created out of the material, so to
speak, of the idealized imagoes. So even this form of growth is not
simply adding to what is but is slowly transforming the self.

It is

suggested that the slow strengthening and transformation of this pole
of the self eventuates in its capacity to use its newly formed but
relatively stable contents, firmly and cohesively enough established
now, to assist in its tran�ition across the helix towards a new ad
venture into independence and autonomy.
This point might be made clearer by bringing together Kegan's
"subject to object" shift and Kohut's "transmuting internalization."
Any shift of some part of the self from subject to object involves a
major internal and external reorganization.

This does not happen
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easily or quickly.

Kohut gave us a conceptualization of how this

process transpires from minute accumulations into enough mass to
create the conditions for the shift.

Kohut showed how the self, in a

given selfobject connection, mirroring, for example, slowly internal
izes the function of the selfobject, and thereby builds structure in
that pole of the self so that eventually it no longer needs that par
ticular form of selfobject.

This can help to understand how from

Kegan 1 s point of view what was subject (fused with the selfobject) is
transformed into object by the minute building up of that capacity or
function until it has the weight and strength to push away from (dif
ferentiate) the selfobject (its former embeddedness) and own that
function and capacity for itself (take it as object).
Two points need to be mentioned here.

First, although Kohut

referred to the IPI and GS and their respective attachments to self
objects as transference-like attachments, he made it clear that these
are not transferences in the traditional sense of the term.

They are

(both in the therapy of disorders of the self and in normal develop
ment) actual, needed formations of self and other connections de
signed to facilitate the flow of nurturance from the selfobject to
the self.

They are, as it were, configurations of psychic receptor

cells designed to attach and receive specific nutrients from specific
sending units.

A second point is that Kohut (1977) did not write

extensively or specifically about the possible sequential or alter
nating constellation of the IPI and the GS.

However, he did indicate

in several clinical cases that the transference-like attachments are
generally constellated in one form at a time and that the shift to
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another would occur with some difficulty over a period of time.

The

view here is an extrapolation of his suggestions to normal develop
ment in which it is hypothesized that one constellation tends to
predominate at a given stage of life.
To continue the integration, it is suggested that when the self
is organized cognitively and perceptually around the autonomy pole
(Kegan), the primary nutritional attachment takes the form of a GS
constellation with the other.
11

11

Growth of the self would occur

within the basic configuration by virtue of infusions of energy to
the GS via the media of mirroring.

The ambitions of this uniquely

constituted nuclear self, expressing itself and taking pleasure in
its own sense of aliveness, would find its culturing environment
holding and confirming it (Kegan) in the highly specialized and ac
tive confirmation form of mirroring (Kohut).

It is as though the

psychic musculature is strengthened by applause, echo, and amplifica
tion from the environment.
Another aspect of the process of growth on this side of the
helix, from Kohut's contribution, would be the slow, microinternaliz
ing of the selfobject's functions of repairing and soothing the self
after disappointments and blows to self-esteem.

The microinfusions

of numerous mirror experiences would result in the growth and
strengthening of the self's sense of separateness and specialness to
the point where the sense of the self was firm enough to handle the
next journey towards inclusion without being too much threatened by a
sense that it would lose its coherence and uniqueness by again merg
ing to some extent with another.
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Any attempt to integrate these views on the process of growth
would not be complete without relating Kegan's notion of "contradic
tion" to Kohut's notion of "optimal frustration."

In both cases

these concepts deal with essential functions of the culturing envi
ronment that foster growth.

The term contradiction has a negative

sound that may be misleading.

Kegan often suggested a more positive

connotation by referring to contradiction as encouragement. The
concept essentially refers to the supportive effort of caretakers to
encourage and foster the next higher level of behavior and maturity.
While impulsiveness might be appropriately confirmed at one time and
age, it would be discouraged at another, and the capacity for pa
tience and delayed gratification would be encouraged and rewarded.
This type of response from caring others helps the growing child
separate from the "old" self and take on the "new" self.
Likewise for Kohut, the caring parent, many times unintention
ally but at other appropriate times very intentionally, does not
mirror certain behaviors.

Thus, those expressions no longer get

reinforced, and the child is challenged to find new behaviors that
will get mirrored.

Similarly, with the performance of the idealized

parent, there will come times when empathy is absent and other times
when the parent chooses not to perform the role of the strong and
competent hero, encouraging the child to perform the task for him or
her self.

Kohut and Kegan appear remarkably similar in their descriptions
of these functions of the environment.

What is different in their

total conceptions of these functions is again influenced by the
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origins of their theories.

The key to growth in response to optimal

frustration is Kohut's notion of the repair and restoration of the
empathic bond with the selfobject after the self has experienced fear
and anger in the face of the temporary loss of support which occa
sioned the self's effort to solve the problem on its own or to soothe
its own fears.

It is this restoration that strengthens and inspires

the child to handle and integrate the new way of doing things, even
if it is more difficult or challenging.

Thus an affective bond seems

to underlie the growth process.
The issue of anger and conflict between the child and caregiver,
and even intense rage and hatred are much more important aspects in
the growth process for Kohut with his psychoanalytic views of the
child and parent drama than they are for Kegan.

For Kohut, it is

within the matrix of affective intensity that the wound from faulty
empathy occurs, with the resulting anger and rift in the relation
ship.

And this same matrix of love and hate creates the context for

restoration, for the healing of the wound and the restoration of an
empathic connection.

Paradoxically, it is through just such intense

dramas carried on in numerous small and some large ways, that growth
in the self occurs.
For Kegan the key to growth is that the 11 contradictions 11 of the
parent encourage or urge the child to develop a new way of making
sense out of what the other is doing and what the self and other
really are or mean in relation to each other.

The child grows by

making meaning out of things in a larger perspective.

Kegan's theory

is cast much more in the manner of theories which suggest cognitive
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dissonance as the motivation to growth, and the growth that occurs is
described more in terms of an enlarged or more elaborated perspective
and reorganized relationship of the self and the other rather than in
terms of a strengthened affective bond in the relationship.
A Third Dimension.
It is intriguing that both Kohut and Kegan dealt with a third
type of configuration of the self and other.

In both cases this

configuration does not seem to fit into the basic dual framework as
part of the underlying tension of dynamic opposites.

For that reason

it was not included as a basic part of the integration of these theo
ries, and yet it is too significant a part of each theory to be omit
ted.

It is almost as though this third type of connection with the

"other" has a special and temporary purpose called upon at special
times.

Kegan's notion seems closely identified with the concept in

object relations theory called the transitional object (Winnicott,
1965).

He spoke of a "medium of transition" and of "subject-object

bridges" which constitute a configuration of self and other that does
not fall into either the psychologies of inclusion or autonomy.
Rather they are a type of connection with others (or objects or sym
bols) in which the self is like the other but not the same as the
other.

The special need for such a vehicle to support and carry the

self arises especially during the unstable times of transition from
one side of the helix to the other.

During these times the self

apparently needs a connection that is familiar enough and alike
enough to be a reminder of the old self, but which is paradoxically
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separate from the self enough to be discarded when no longer needed.
Early examples would be blankets and teddy bears; later examples
might be imaginary playmates (part of whose function it is to bear
the projections of the self that are being discarded and separated
from), and still later examples would be pals who are slightly
younger but are associated with the way one was and from which he or
she is now differentiating.
Kohut likewise found more and more of a need to come to terms
with a third configuration.

Early in his work he spoke only of the

bipolar self as the basic constituents, but he always included a
third set of components--the talents and skills (the unique constitu
tional gifts and tendencies) which develop on the "tension arc" be
tween the basic poles.

In his later writings this component of the

self takes on a more prominent role with respect to the GS and the
IPI.

In his last book, Kohut (1984) began to speak of the possible

theoretical value of conceptualizing a tripolar self.
As was the case with the GS and the IPI, the third constituent
of the self emerged directly from Kohut's primary data vis-a-vis the
therapist and patient in analysis.

Kohut began to identify a third

transference-like constellation that was different from and required
different therapeutic responses than the mirror or the idealizing
transference.

He called this transference the twinship or alter ego

transference.

He had identified it much earlier in his work (Kohut,

1971) but at that time had thought that it was a special form of the
mirror transference.

Perhaps one reason that Kohut did not recognize

its independent status is that this type of connection with others
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develops somewhat later than the more fundamental constituents of the
self, and its needs are especially felt at special times like transi
tional periods.
Kohut's (1984) description of the type of need the self has for
the other in this configuration is remarkably like Kegan's descrip
tion, and the interesting thing is that his primary sources for this
material are the dream material, transference behaviors, and obses
sional preoccupations of his patients.

He wrote of the "need to

experience the presence of essential alikeness" (p. 194) and of a
specific patient's need to experience "a twin, someone just like
herself and yet not herself to whom she could talk" (p. 196).
For the purposes of this integration it is suggested that
Kegan's medium of transition might be performing the same function of
the culture of embeddedness as the twin or alter ego transference is
for Kohut.

If that is valid, it would suggest that the alter ego

transference is constellated primarily at the times in one's life
when the whole self and other configuration is undergoing a transi
tion.

This may or may not be so, and this aspect of the integration

is more speculative and less easy to support than the other aspects.
In any case it is interesting that both theorists again seem to have
identified a similar phenomenon from very different primary data and
end up explaining some aspects of ordinary, observable behavior in
ways consistent with their own theories.
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Reciprocal Values to Each Other
It has been suggested that one of the ways that Kohut's contri
bution can add richness and depth to Kegan's theory is through the
light it sheds on the nature of the minute interactions between the
self and others and how the accumulation of the effects of these
complex microprocesses can be seen to produce growth in a way that is
harmonious with the larger process of change that Kegan described.
It was also suggested that Kohut's underlying concept of the
self as a "center of initiative" and his conceptualization of the
dual (or triadic) intrapsychic self structure giving specific shape
and qualities and behavioral manifestations to the basic strivings of
the self can add a great deal to Kegan's self concept, which seems in
the end to be limited to the self being a center of existential con
sciousness lacking its own unique and innate psychological potential
ities.
The entire affective domain is another area in which Kohut's
contributions could add a great deal to Kegan's conceptualizations of
the stages as well as the growth process.

Kegan offered a view of

development that is seductively convincing as a description of devel
opment until one tries to fit real people into it.

When one does so

the clarity of the stages and how an actual individual is manifesting
the characteristics of a given stage becomes much less clear.

The

problem is that the theory is presented as a common pattern through
which everyone moves in essentially the same way.

The affective

dynamics and the whole psychoanalytic system of defenses against
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undesirable affects could add a great deal to the picture of how
different each individual might look in his or her attempts to nego
tiate a given era or transition.
This study has been restricted to these developmental views as
they relate to normal and healthy development, but the infinite vari
ations on normal and the complex mixture of healthy and unhealthy
traits in most individuals presents a great challenge to any theory
of normal development.

It is suggested here that Kohut's contribu

tion could add a great deal in the way of explaining not only patho
logical deviations in development but also the infinite variety of
so-called normal development.
What Kegan's contributions might add to a theory like self psy
chology would be a rich body of "real life" observational material
that gives support and confirmation of the more experience-distant
concepts and constructs of an intrapsychic theory.

Kegan's research

and anecdotal material gives full color and life-blood to the ab
stract concepts such as grandiose self structure.

Furthermore, his

distinct stages help to identify the qualitative and quantitative
differences that might obtain between different levels of maturity in
the self and selfobjects.

Kegan demonstrated the behavioral manifes

tations and the real life relationship patterns that are embodiments
of these underlying constructs.
One example of this would be the issue of idealized heroes.
Kohut makes a great deal of the need of the growing self to create
and connect with idealized figures and later to internalize aspects
of these heroes.

Kegan's description of the nature of heroes at
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different levels of development can be helpful in differentiating
lesser from more mature selfobject heroes.
Heroes of the Stage l, impulsive and over-included child, are
fantasy heroes of the fairy tales and cartoons.

With these heroes

the child merges psychologically; the child dons the clothing of the
cartoon hero and becomes that hero, participating in his or her
greatness and power.
ity for Kohut.

This illuminates one level of selfobject qual

At the next level, the imperial, independent school

age youngster, heroes are also important, but they function differ
ently.

They are more clearly maintained as real but idealized mod

els, and the child struggles to actually achieve some level of compe
tence in the relevant activity.

As he or she does so, a higher level

of mirroring--recognition, applause, and encouragement--is needed
than the mirroring of infancy that requires exquisite attunement and
co-participation.
At the next stage, the interpersonal, a form of inclusion with
the idealized one is again needed (as in romantic love or team mem
bership).

And the heroes of the Stage 4, independent adult, again

provide a new level or quality as ideals, and function as high level
selfobjects that the self has chosen as supporting ideals.

In short,

as a developmental theory, self psychology is in its infancy, and its
developmental line is very sketchy (Wolf, 1980), so the possible
contributions of a compatible theory that is more richly detailed in
behavioral, interpersonal, and sequential stage characteristics might
be assimilated with great benefit.
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SurTTJ1ary
The basis for this proposed integration of two developmental
theories which are derived from different primary data and which
appear very different on the surface is that each theory rests on a
similar fundamental view of the make-up and functioning of the self.
In each case the unity and wholeness of the self is paradoxically
maintained by the inner relationship of two dynamically opposed as
pects of the self.

These opposite aspects and tendencies are not

opposite in the sense of being mutually exclusive, but in the sense
of being mutually necessary to each other, as a magnetic field re
quires both a north and a south pole.
It is then suggested that fundamental similarities can be drawn
between the way each theorist views each of these constituents or
poles of the self.

Kegan viewed one basic yearning of the self as

the life-long need for and effort to maintain connection and inclu
sion with others.

Kohut described a similar pole of the self that is

formed from thousands of experienced mergers with idealized others.
This pole of the self is motivated by a need to be like others and to
participate in their qualities.
The part of the self opposed to the inclusionary aspect is de
scribed by Kegan as a fundamental yearning for separateness, autono
my, and uniqueness.

Kohut described a similar pole of the self as

the grandiose self.

It represents the inborn potential of the unique

psychological make-up of that self.

It seeks to express and develop

its own nuclear plan independently of the influence of others.
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Since both of these theorists view all psychological development
in terms of an object-relational framework rather than as the devel
opment of an essentially intrapsychic plan of an isolated ego, their
views of the life-long series of 11 object 11 counterparts to the parts
of the self is essential to their views of development.

This study

attempts to show how the "culture of embeddedness, 11 which is Kegan's
broad term for the human holding environment, is similar to the
11

selfobjects 11 of Kohut.

11

other 11 and its relationship to the self show how the self and other

In each case these conceptualizations of the

are to one degree or another psychologically merged or fused as well
as being 11 real 11 others in an interpersonal sense.

The similarity in

these conceptualizations is argued on the basis of the functions that
the 11 other 11 provides to the growing self. Kegan's concept of con
firming, which is needed on both sides of his helix, is compared to
Kohut's two functions of mirroring and idealizability, which can be
seen as two forms of confirmation.

In addition the more 11 negative 11

functions of the environment are compared--Kegan's "contradiction"
and Kohut's "optimal frustration."
The actual growth process itself emphasizes another important
function of the other 11 --the capacity to facilitate the internaliza
11

tion of parts of itself into the growing self by maintaining physical
and emotional presence even in the face of conflict and turmoil.
Their views of the growth process are integrated in the suggestion
that Kegan saw the 7arger process of evo1utionary individuation
whereby major shifts occur that involve transforming what was subject
to the self (its self and other aspects that were unconscious and
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undifferentiated) into objects of the self which it could relate to
and control to some extent.

Kohut 1 s view of the growth process is

integrated into the larger process by the way it explains how the
minute microinternalizations of self structure build up enough
strength and mass to emerge and stand on their own as 11 objects 11 or
capacities that the self can maintain and use with some degree of
control.
A third dimension of the self and its object-relational counter
part is also compared.

This component seems less clearly defined in

both theories and seems to relate to transitional periods in which
the old self and other configuration is undergoing change.

Kegan

spoke of the need of the self for 1 a medium of transition,S' and Kohut
1

spoke of the need for a 11 twinship or alter ego 11 connection with oth
ers.

In both cases it calls for an experience of relatedness with

others that bridges inclusion and independence--a sense of being
alike but not the same as the other.
Finally some suggestion is given for how each theory has areas
of strength which might be integrated by the other theory to contrib
ute to areas of that theory that are less developed.

It is suggested

that the Kegan's clear conceptualization of the stages and his rich
descriptions of actual human relationships and behaviors might be
helpful in elaborating the sketchy developmental line of self and
selfobject as it currently stands in self psychology.

It is sug

gested that Kohut's affective emphasis can add a great deal to under
standing the inner experiences of the self within stages and in its
transitional struggles.

Finally, the point is made that Kohut's
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affective and psychodynamic emphasis might contribute a better under
standing of the great diversity and deviation by individuals on their
presumed common trek up the helix.

CHAPTER V
FUTURE RESEARCH
Kohut has been criticized for his independent and isolated ap
proach to the development of the theory of self psychology (Greenberg
& Mitchell, 1983). Kohut's (1980) response was that he had no objec
tions in principle to attempts at integration of self psychology with
other theories, but that self psychology needed a time to establish
and consolidate itself before the benefits of cross-fertilization
with other theories could be realized.
In response to an effort by Shane and Shane (1980) to draw some
broad lines of integration between developmental theories of the self
(particularly with respect to Winnicott, Spitz, and Mahler), Kohut
(1980) had this to say:
Self psychology does not see the essence of man's develop
ment as a move from dependence to independence, from merger
to autonomy, or even as a move from.no-self to self. We do
not disregard man's anxieties and depressions, in infancy,
in adulthood, and when face to face with death. And while
we certainly do not ignore man's greed and lust or his
destructive rage, we see them not as primary givens but as
secondary phenomena due to disturbances in the self
selfobject unit. Accordingly, we do not focus our atten
tion on the baby's anxiety vis-a-vis strangers (Spitz), his
clutching of substitutes for the unresponsive or unavail
able mother (Winnicott), or the affective and ideational
swings that accompany his reluctant move from symbiotic
existence to individuality (Mahler) as if these phenomena
represent primary and circumscribed psychological configu
rations. From the vantage point of self psychology, these
phenomena are secondary, their meaning and significance
becoming understandable only when seen from the point of
view of man's abiding need for selfobjects throughout the
whole span of life. What we have begun to study,
134
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therefore, and what we hope, in the future, to investigate
in fruitful cooperation with others, is the sequence of
self-selfobject relationships that occur throughout life.
(p. 479)
This quotation was selected because it represents both the historical
reluctance of Kohut to integrate self psychology with other theories
before it has firmly consolidated itself (much as the self needs to
do in its own development) and also his hope that eventually such
mutually beneficial integration will take place.
It was the intention of this study to help lay the theoretical
groundwork for using Kegan's cognitive developmental stages as a
reference framework for elaborating the sequence of selfobjects of
which Kohut wrote.

Kegan (1990) has indicated that he sees strong

connections between Kohut's work and his own.

In addition he stated

that a number of scholars considered to be in Kohut's inner circle
(Michael Basch, Ernest Wolf, and Marion Tolpin) have been complimen
tary of his work and also see strong connections between the two
theories.

Thus, there appears to be some foundation for the prospect

of future research aimed at integrating these two theories.
After offering a detailed description of the processes by which
the self is formed, Kohut (1977) stated that a great many "how and
when" questions remained to be answered.

He indicated that they

would have to be answered with the combined research efforts from
different approaches including the direct observation of children.
He stated these questions:
(1) how the constituents of the nuclear self are gathered
and how they become integrated to form the specific energic
tension arc (from nuclear ambitions via nuclear talents and
skills to nuclear idealized goals) that persists throughout
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each person's lifetime; (2) when the several constituents
of the nuclear self are acquired (when, for example, the
nuclear ambitions are established through the consolidation
of the central grandiose-exhibitionistic fantasies, when
the nuclear structure of the specific idealized goals7s
set up which thereafter remains permanent, etc.) and (3)
when the whole series of processes by which the nuclear
self is laid down may be said to have in essence its begin
ning and when it has its end. (pp. 178-179)
Kohut (1977) speculated that the bulk of nuclear grandiosity consoli
dates into nuclear ambitions in the second, third, and fourth years,
and that the bulk of the nuclear idealized goal structure is laid
down in the fourth, fifth, and sixth years.
One way to research the possible correspondence between the
proposed stages of the two theories would be to use the instrument
that Kegan has been developing over the last several years to deter
mine subject-object levels of development (Lahey, Souvaine, Kegan,

Goodman, & Felix, undated). This instrument attempts through a

structured interview to determine where an individual would be placed
along five increasingly complicated epistemologies (ways of making
meaning) corresponding to Kegan's eras.

It is possible that studies

could be devised in which examiners trained from a self psychology
perspective would interview subjects and rate their mode and level of
selfobject connection; these same subjects could be interviewed with
Kegan's instrument, and the findings correlated.
One speculation that comes to mind for this writer after having
studied the corresponding features of these two theories is that
Kohut's view of the early years, particularly ages 2 and 3, might
offer material that could lead Kegan to consider a possible altera
tion and addition to his helix. This would be the consideration of
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an early, short-lived swing to the autonomy side of the helix.

It

might be considered a weakness in Kegan's theory that he deals rather
lightly and generally with an area of development that has received
so much attention from both psychoanalytic theory and from infant
studies, that is, from infancy to about 3 years of age.

In Kegan's

schema there is only one configuration (after the incorporative
stage) of the self-other or subject-object make-up from birth to
about age 6--the impulsive era.
Kohut's theorizing would suggest that there is an early move
towards autonomy, along with the needed selfobject constellation of
mirroring, that occurs just after the emergence from the archaic
fusion with the selfobject (Wolf, 1980).

This would correspond gen

erally with the separation-individuation phase of Mahler's et al.
(1975) theory and precisely with the practicing subphase of that
period.

It would be based primarily on the simple need to be sepa

rate, no longer incorporated and totally fused.

It would consolidate

the first efforts of the infant to experience and express itself as a
unique and separate center of initiative and awareness.

This would

be Kohut's grandiose 2-year-old whose oyster is the entire world (now
that it is out there in a relatively stable and separate way), and
who needs mirroring to confirm his grand exploits as an independent
adventurer.

This is different from the archaic mirroring that con

firms and supports the infant's very capacity to have coherent, psy
chologically organized responses to experiences.
The healthy establishment of this basic and primitive level of
individuation would result in a grandiose self firm enough in its
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psychological boundaries not to be overwhelmed by the fear of being
totally absorbed again into the selfobject.

Once this fear is re

duced, the grandiose infant can risk the process of plunging whole
heartedly back into the family culture of embeddedness in what Kegan
Those extending the work of Kohut need to

called the impulsive era.

begin building constructs that can be empirically tested to demon
strate these levels of selfobject connections.
This study has been restricted almost entirely to normal devel
opment.

The reason for that is that Kegan's theory is intended as a

theory of normal development, even though it has many implications
for understanding pathological development and what might constitute
a therapeutic environment, both in clinical settings and in natural
circumstances.

Kohut's theory of development was derived from clini

cal settings and is deeply influenced by issues of pathology and the
treatment of pathology.

Yet Kohut (1977, 1984) clearly views his

overall theory as a theory of health rather than a theory of disease.
Nevertheless, it is his contribution towards the understanding and
treating the whole self in its lifelong relationship with others that
Kohut's strength lies.

Therefore, it is suggested that the whole

area of psychopathology--its origins, diagnosis, and treatment--would
richly benefit from studies that interface the work of Kegan with
that of Kohut.
Once valid correlations have been worked out between Kegan's
eras and Kohut's selfobjects levels, disturbed individuals could be
studied with respect to their demonstrating extreme or distorted
positions on Kegan's helix.

These conditions could be studied with
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respect to Kohut's (1977 ) constructs about self pathology, which
includes two major forms--compensatory structure built into one of
the poles to make up for deficiencies in another, and defensive
structure (pathologically organized self structure) that defends
against the self's ultimate anxiety--fragmentation.
It is possible that such studies would reveal that a specific
self defect (for example a depleted, weak grandiose self) would re
sult in that individual s attempt to go through life, in Kegan's
1

terms, by trying to stay on the inclusion side of the helix.

In

other words such an individual might try to jump the ladder from the
type of relationships characterized by the impulsive era to those
characterized by the interpersonal era after an abortive attempt to
master the next level of autonomy and independence.

A therapist from

a self psychology perspective might hypothesize and anticipate that
such a patient would form a certain level and type of mirror trans
ference.

That hypothesis would inform the therapeutic responses and

shape the kind of context he or she might attempt to create.
With respect to interfacing the therapeutic implications of the
work of Kegan and Kohut, the heart of the issue would revolve around
the concept of empathy.

Kohut is well known if perhaps often mis

understood for his emphasis on the value of empathy in psychotherapy.
He has on many occasions (1971, 1977, 1984) attempted to answer his
critics who simplify his use of the concept by suggesting that he is
calling for more warmth or sympathy from the therapist.

His view of

the nature and purpose of empathy is much more technical and scien
tific than is often realized.

Kohut (1984) stated:
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Empathy is the operation that defines the field of psycho
analysis. No psychology of complex mental states is con
ceivable without the employment of empathy. It is a value
neutral tool of observation which (a) can lead to correct
or incorrect results, (b) can be used in the service of
either compassionate, inimical, or dispassionate-neutral
purposes, and (c) can be employed either rapidly and out
side awareness or slowly and deliberately, with focused
conscious attention. We define it as 11vicarious introspec
tion 11 or, more simply, as one person's· (attempt to) experi
ence the inner life of another while simultaneously retain
ing the stance of an objective observer. (p. 175)
Kohut's point is that self psychology has not so much introduced a
new kind of empathy into psychoanalytic theory but that its theoreti
cal perspective (especially the selfobject concept as demonstrated in
transference-like constellations as well as in normal, sequential,
maturing forms) can broaden and deepen the therapist's ability to
understand and empathize with the experience of the client.
Kegan (1982), in writing about applying his framework of a sequence of meaning-making systems to therapy, said:
As a clinician I am attending to the way this framework
might help clinicians in their most fundamental activity:
conveying to the client that they understand something of
his or her experience in the way he or she experiences it.
Why this activity on the part of the therapist is so cru
cial to the client's thriving has not been well understood,
although it has been long appreciated by phenomenological
and client-centered psychologists and is lately being re
discovered by psychiatry through the work of Heinz Kohut.
In this book I try to demonstrate that this special kind of
empathy is crucial at every phase in the lifespan because
it is actually intrinsic to the process by which we de
velop. (p. viii)
It is the point of this entire study that Kegan and Kohut may be
elucidating and articulating different perspectives on the same very
subtle aspect of the lifelong self and other relationship.

It has to

do with the� the environment holds, nurtures, and fosters the
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psychological growth of the individual, and the way the growing indi
vidual forms the type of connections that will meet its needs.

If

Kegan's work is about establishing that empathy is intrinsic to the
process at every stage of development, Kohut's work is about how
empathy works at the minutest level of self and other interactions.
Central to every aspect of each of these views is the unending
need for a responsive, attuned, and empathetic environment.

Kegan

has emphasized and developed with great detail the observable, "real
world" stages and functions by which a reasonably normal environment
provides the sequential supporting cultures needed for growth.

In so

doing he helps the reader understand the ordinary behaviors and roles
that individuals provide for each other from a whole new perspective.
Kegan also speculates on what this experience is like from the inside
of the participating self, but Kegan's strength is not in this area.
Kohut, through vicarious introspection, has observed what he
believes to be the minute processes by which the self feeds from its
selfobjects.

From these data he has built a theory of intrapsychic

structure and functioning vis-a-vis selfobjects.

The landscape of

Kegan's vision of development can use the magnification powers and
focused beam of Kohut's vision to examine and elucidate the intricate
pathways by which empathy promotes the growth of the self.
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